For Peace, U.S.
Must Pledge Not to Topple Pyongyang Regime (Huanqiu, People's Republic of
China)
What are the
preconditions for an end to the North Korea crisis? While most Western
observers would say a regime change in Pyongyang is the key, Beijing warns just
the opposite. According to this editorial from China's state-run Huanqiu, only a 'guarantee of DPRK national and regime security' coupled with a 'normalization of North Korea's economy' will bring an end to the crisis. Meanwhile, according to the state-approved editorial, rather than asserting itself on the issue, China should 'go with the flow.'
Kim Jongh-un waves a pistol while 'inspecting' Korean People's Army Unit 1973: Should the United States and its allies promise not to topple his regime in exchange for an end to the North Korea nuclear crisis? According to Beijing, that is what it is going to take.
North Korea announced Tuesday that it would restart its Yongbyon nuclear reactor, which means that it will have
more of the essential materials, namely plutonium, to manufacture nuclear
weapons. Pyongyang, by confronting both the United States and South Korea with
its "illicit" nuclear program and intensifying its nuclear threats,
has worsened the deadlock over the nuclear issue.
After this latest action by North Korea, the U.S. and South
Korea will find it difficult to come up with new countermeasures. The North
Korea nuclear issue is almost completely out of control, and countries in the
region are watching as Pyongyang, at least for the moment, has gained the
advantage in its confrontation with the U.S.-South Korea alliance, and is
creating instability in Northeast Asia.
Perhaps the outside world needs to take another look at
North Korea in order to understand that there are a number of issues that will make
the country harder to deal with in the future.
First, in the
context of the Cold War paradigm that exists on the Korean Peninsula, the
chances of persuading the North to give up its nuclear program are slim to none.
Outside of course, the international community can insist that it will never
acknowledge North Korea's nuclear status. But it would be more realistic to seek
a freeze in its nuclear status in order to prevent it from conducting new
nuclear tests.
Second, preconditions
for a soft-landing of this entire situation are a normalization of North
Korea's economy, as well as a guarantee of DPRK
national and regime security. Until that happens, Pyongyang will continue to
make trouble.
Third, the
situation will not change if the South acquires nuclear weapons. Even then, South
Korea will continue to be held "hostage" by the North.
Fourth, North
Korea won't dare to attack the United States, but its long-range missile
capability will increasingly reduce U.S. deterrence. North Korea will not mount
a large-scale attack of the South, but it will continue its hard-line policy
until South Korea feels equally as uncomfortable.
Fifth, North
Korea is still one of the weakest countries in Northeast Asia. The North Korean
regime must not be permitted to get "carried away" with itself and be
permitted to believe it is a "real power." China has been incapable
of persuading the North to give up its nuclear program, but it can do more to
urge the North Korean regime to remain calm.
Sixth, in the
context of the nuclear issue, China is in its customary "passive"
position. That is, passive in relation to other countries in the region who
regard the situation as more threatening. In this case, there are no
"active" countries. China must continue to acquire military and
economic power. This will allow China to handle these strategic dilemmas with
more skill, and ease any embarrassment it currently faces.
The North's decision to restart its Yongbyon
nuclear reactor is only one scene of the larger play called the North Korean
Nuclear Issue. The United States has practically given up on demanding that
Pyongyang abandon its nuclear program. Because although the U.S. has increased
its aid to North Korea, hardened sanctions, and raised the tempo of its intimidating
military exercises, Washington has refused any serious exchanges with the country.
[North Korea seeks direct bilateral talks and a peace treaty to replace the
1953 armistice.] That is why over time, the demand that North Korea abandon its
nuclear program has become like an empty slogan.
China should also continue to seek a denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. But if it adopts a less adamant approach, things will go a
lot easier. China's overriding strategic goal should be to make sure that a
major war on the Korean Peninsula never occurs.
When it comes to the future of the Korean Peninsula,
there are all kinds of uncertainties. China cannot preemptively deal with these
challenges and opportunities. It can only seek greater flexibility, which will emerge
from increased national strength.
China must ensure that it doesn't become the first and
biggest victim of a war on the Korean Peninsula. If China seeks to control the
situation, it will be at a loss. Not only on this issue but elsewhere, China
should seek to "dictate by going with the flow."
China must enhance its capacity to endure a crisis on the
peninsula, and must have firm plans for dealing with any eventuality. This is
the basis of its strategic initiative. Following through on this, we will
expand our strategic space and have ever-greater flexibility.
