The Unintended Consequences of a Nuclear-Defanged Iran (AlqudsAlarabi, U.K)
"Iran, after abandoning its military nuclear program, will
be able to focus its efforts on asserting its influence in the region and being
a regional power - at the expense of its main rival: Saudi Arabia. ... The
easing of sanctions will increase the wealth and power of Iran, which will redound
to the benefit of its regional allies. In response, the Gulf States are closing
ranks and offering greater support to their allies in the face of rising Iranian
influence."
Iranian newspapers talk of retention of nuclear rights and defeating sanctions, but behind the propaganda, a nuclear deal with the allies is likely to boost Iranian influence significantly.
The
accelerating political and security developments in the Middle East warn of
newly-forged coalitions that are unfortunately
sectarian-based.
Take
the regional confrontation over Syria, where the opposition is backed by the
Gulf States, primarily Saudi Arabia, and Riyadh has launched a savage media campaign
against Iran based on its interference in Syria. Meanwhile, Tehran has adopted the
language of the Syrian regime, which accuses Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey,
of funding "terrorism" in Syria.
This,
associated with the newest development - Iran-U.S. rapprochement, after 33
years of conflict - looks likely to transform regional alliances and relations
in the region, particularly with the Gulf States feeling marginalized after the
accord, and the disclosure that it was preceded by months of secret talks
between Washington and Tehran.
Iran,
after abandoning its military nuclear program, will be able to focus its
efforts on asserting its influence in the region and being a regional power -
at the expense of its main rival: Saudi Arabia.
The
easing of sanctions will increase the wealth and power of Iran, which will redound
to the benefit of its regional allies. In response, the Gulf States are closing
ranks and offering greater support to their allies in the face of rising Iranian
influence.
Posted By Worldmeets.US
This
coincides with twin suicide bombing attacks in Beirut by the al-Qaeda-linked Abdullah Azzam Brigades that targeted the Iranian Embassy last
Tuesday. The attack killed and wounding scores of people, amongst whom the
Embassy’s cultural attaché. Noteworthy was the response of Hezbullah Secretary
General Hasan Nasrallah, who described the attack as
an attempt to compensate for the series of setbacks suffered by its [Gulf] adversaries,
the Syria issue being one. This was a clear allusion to Saudi Arabia.
The
bombings and subsequent bombings near the Saudi border by the so-called al-Mukhtar
Army, which is known for its links to Iran, portend a new upwelling of
sectarian tension.
Although
the Syrian revolution wasn't spurred by Assad being a Sunni leader, the support
he enjoys from Shiíte forces [Iran] while in a
confrontation with armed militants linked to al-Qaeda [Sunni] paints a particularly
sectarian picture, which is reinforcing sectarian tension and polarization.
So
the conflict in Syria, militarily, let alone politically irreconcilable, and the
[U.S.-Iran] nuclear accord, create a regional system defined by a Shiite axis led
by Iran that includes Syria, Hezbullah and Iraq; and a Sunni axis led by Saudi
Arabia that includes most Sunni majority countries. In view of the situation in
Bahrain, and the intervention by Iran and al-Qaeda that have so far prevented a
satisfactory settlement of disputes in places like Yemen, tension and turmoil is
likely to now spread to the Gulf, fulfilling many of the predictions that have
been made in recent years.
Although
the goal of the nuclear accord, namely preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon, is clear, Iran-U.S. rapprochement raises concerns in many Arab capitals,
especially in the Gulf, since its ultimate destination and the manner in which
it will be employed remain unknown.
Iran
has nominated itself to play a regional role that coincides with America's
desire to alleviate the burdens of its strategy of direct involvement by relying
more on regional allies capable of being deputized. And all this while the Arab
World is going through a period of transition and uncertainty. Yet the
circumstances that qualified the Shah of Iran to be policeman of the Gulf no
longer exist. Granting such status to an Iran under the "Guardianship
of Islamic Jurists" is simply not possible.
However,
should Arabs, especially in the Gulf, deal with the variables of the current
situation with greater, more flexible and cohesive statesmanship, at least it
will be possible to limit their losses.
