NATO 'Never Promised' Not to Expand Eastward (Novaya Gazeta, Russia)
"Even the most farsighted politician couldn't then have foreseen
what happened, in terms of history, in an instant: in East Europe, communist
regimes collapsed one after the other, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the
Warsaw Pact ceased to exist. There was a vacuum in the system of international
security. In this situation, for the young Eastern European democracies, NATO
was a more natural and attractive partner that their old ally in Moscow. ... If
the Russian politicians accusing the West of deception have any kind of
documentary evidence of promises not to expand NATO to the east, now would be a
good time to show it."
Former West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher: what, if anything, did he promise the Russians about NATO expansion? Limited assurances but not promises, the record shows.
Russian
officials, politicians, and television propagandists often make accusations against
the West: promises were made not to expand NATO to the east, but they turned
out to be liars, as NATO planes and tanks are now firmly established on the
boarders of Russia. In response, Western politicians only shrug their shoulders
- no one was promised any such thing.
In
1990, a major international problem was the reunification of Germany. West
German politicians faced a daunting task: to find arguments for the victorious
powers, and above all, the Soviet Union, that would convince them that the
German nation had the right to choose its own destiny. Responsibility for
developing the relevant arguments belonged to then-West German Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher.
Given
the active discussions within German and international political circles and fears
that the Soviet Union would be unlikely to approve NATO membership for a united
Germany, FAZ
writes that Genscher decided to get a sense of the public's
position about entering NATO.
Without
coordinating his comments with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his advisers, at the
Evangelical Academy in the village of Tutzing on
January 31, 1990, Genscher made a speech in which he clearly
stated that “the expansion of NATO into territories to the east, up to the borders
of the Soviet Union, which is the fear behind the formation of the Warsaw Pact,
will never happen.” He added that certain security guarantees should be implemented
that take into account the interests of the Soviet Union, and that the territory
of the German Democratic Republic [East Germany] would be a demilitarized zone.
These
proposals formed the basis of the so called, “Tutzing formula,” which in February 1990 was used by U.S. State
Secretary James Baker and then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl in preliminary talks with
the Soviet leadership about German unification.
Later, neither
Baker nor Genscher interpreted anything said during these
negotiations as a promise to the Kremlin not to expand NATO to the east. During
an interview with Der Spiegel in 2009, the former German foreign
minister noted that then he was only testing the ground in anticipation of
actual negotiations. In addition he said that the formula they invented had a rather
short lifespan.
[Editor's
Note: Paradoxically, according to the Der Spiegel column
cited above, it is clear that every effort was made to give the impression that
NATO would not expand east:
After
speaking with many of those involved and examining previously classified
British and German documents in detail, SPIEGEL has concluded that there was no
doubt that the West did everything it could to give the Soviets the impression
that NATO membership was out of the question for countries like Poland, Hungary
or Czechoslovakia.
On Feb. 10,
1990, between 4 and 6:30 p.m., Genscher spoke with Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. According to the German record of the
conversation, which was only recently declassified, Genscher
said: "We are aware that NATO membership for a unified Germany raises
complicated questions. For us, however, one thing is certain: NATO will not
expand to the east." And because the conversion revolved mainly around
East Germany, Genscher added explicitly: "As far
as the non-expansion of NATO is concerned, this also applies in general."
Shevardnadze
replied that he believed "everything the minister (Genscher)
said."]
At a meeting at
Camp David in late February 1990, U.S. President George H.W.
Bush convinced Chancellor Kohl that the demilitarization of the eastern part of
a united Germany would be contrary to the obligations of NATO to protect the
country. As a possible concession to Moscow, the two leaders agreed on the designation
“special military status,” for the former East Germany, which didn't exclude
its inclusion in the jurisdiction of the Alliance, and to offer to discuss this
status in the course of talks among the 4+2 (the Soviet Union, United States,
United Kingdom, France plus West Germany and East Germany). And not a word of
any promises not to expand NATO eastwards, says FAZ, not verbally much less in
writing.
Even the most
farsighted politician couldn't then have foreseen what happened, in terms of history,
in an instant: in East Europe, communist regimes collapsed one after the other,
the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist. There was a
vacuum in the system of international security. In this situation, for the
young Eastern European democracies, NATO was a more natural and attractive
partner that their old ally in Moscow.
If the Russian
politicians accusing the West of deception have any kind of documentary
evidence of promises not to expand NATO to the east, now would be a good time to
show it.
