A Way Out of the Georgia Crisis for Russia
and the West
"The general state of relations between Russia and the
West is deteriorating by the hour. … The enlargement of Europe can be carried
out only with the consent of Russia; and only if Russia advances along a path
as a partner with special status within the European Union."
The general state of
relations between Russia and the West is deteriorating by the hour. While,
contrary to the agreement signed by Nicolas Sarkozy and Dmitri Medvedev,
Russian troops continue to occupy portions of Georgian territory - outside of
Abkhazia and Ossetia, rumors of a possible confrontation between Russia and
Ukraine are gathering apace.
Nicolas
Sarkozy talks the E.U. out of doing anything rash, at
the
E.U. summit on the Georgia crisis, Sept. 1.
Everyone is talking about
"Cold War," but rather, it brings to mind a sort of war of secession
that will end up being played out nearly 20 years after the implosion of the
Soviet Empire. When the presidents of three Baltic States (Poland, Ukraine and
Georgia) express their solidarity in confronting Moscow, the fear arises of
triggering a fatal conflict between two relatively equal parts of the former
Soviet Empire, rather than a deliberate attempt to cause harm on either side.
Yet it's in the nature of
extreme situations to produce effects that are excessively negative or
excessively positive, according to the artfulness and ability that politicians
bring to them. In 1914, but in reality as early as 1912, the explosion of the
Balkans and the Ottoman Empire led to global war [WWI], but 36 years earlier,
the crisis of 1878 between Russia and Turkey which was no less serious, led to
the Congress of Berlin and the triumph of the moderate ideas of
Bismarck , the assurance
of a continental peace that extended over several decades, the "Beautiful
Era [Belle Epoque].
Congress
of Berlin, June 17-July 17, 1878. Peace reigned in Europe
for 35 years after the meeting - finally coming to an end with
WWI.
Another life-saving Congress
of Berlin is now possible and by a very strange combination of factors, it is
France that can take the initiative. America, indeed, is at the moment
paralyzed by its presidential election and the accumulation of errors it has
committed vis-à-vis Russia since 2001. Germany, of all the countries in the E.U. the nearest in every respect to Russia, is embarrassed
by the scheduled and inevitable decline of the grand coalition [NATO]. Thanks
to Nicolas Sarkozy's new foreign policy, France has
reassured Washington of his loyalty to its ally, most recently on Afghanistan.
At the same time and at the
height of the crisis, Sarkozy has at no time abandoned either the Polish nor
the Georgians at the European Council ,
and thus has built a reputation as a defender of freedom in Eastern Europe. At
the same time because they see France as their essential interlocutor in Europe
- both because Sarkozy had already proposed a compromise at his first meeting
with Medvedev that was acceptable for the Russians; and because France is committing
to increasingly its considerable projects with Russia - the Russians seem
willing to talk to France about a settlement of a crisis that is being played
out chiefly among Europeans.
Here begins the
careful surgery: the French and the other Europeans in their train must
indicate clearly to the Russians that they will not alter their opposition on
the presence of Ukraine and Georgia in NATO … at least in its current state.
They must also make it known to Moscow that they will not pass a sanctions regime
except as a last resort. But at the same time they must make clear to the
Kremlin that the E.U. could quickly accept the
principle of the candidacy of Ukraine or Georgia to the European Union.
But for reasons
that are principled and not tactical, the enlargement of Europe can be carried
out only with the consent of Russia; and only if Russia advances along a path
as a partner with special status within the European Union, which would be at
least on par with that of Ukraine. If Russia agrees to enter into such a
mechanism of negotiations, Russians and Western Europeans could then build a
continent-wide dialogue that would change the face of the world.
The first act of this great
reversal would be the creation of a veritable energetic community, where
Europe would be assured of a smooth supply of oil and gas, and where Russia
would in turn obtain the financing and markets for its true expansion.
Regarding the final status of Abkhazia and Ossetia, this should be frozen until
the convening of a peace conference in Transcaucasia, which should also solve
the Karabakh problem between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, with the presence of the Americans and the
indispensable Turks. If France begins to unblock this path, it could then more
easily develop, along with Germany, a sort of European board of directors, the
importance of which has now has become very clear.
Yet
another simmering crisis in the Caucuses:
Armenia
vs. Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
If Russia, which has already
been repudiated for its use of excessive force by China and Central Asia,
understands that it can emerge from this great crisis, she will win a major
victory for those who wish to encircle and gag it, but also for itself.
