ISIL: The Latest Disastrous Tool of Western Statecraft (Carta Maior, Brazil)
"ISIL, at first manipulated by Saudi Arabia, with the capacity
to unify a wide swath of Arab territory under its authority and eliminate
Iranian influence in the region, became increasingly autonomous, and eventually
adopted the ideals of al-Qaeda. ... For the sake of its obsessively anti-Iranian
stance, Washington permitted the growth of Wahhabi
fundamentalism (the most radical branch of Sunni Islam), and the formation of a
large army, to which it gave a territorial basis for dominating regions of
Syria and Iraq - something that al-Qaeda never succeeded in doing. In all, the
United States acted like Harry Potter upon obtaining his first magic wand: it
liberated forces it didn't understand or control."
The
Western press, and given its habitual addiction to mimicry, the Brazilian
media, have chosen to adopt a narrative that looks at the current Middle East
situation in terms of intra-Islamic conflict, highlighting the confrontation
between different conceptions of Islam, in particular, between Sunnis and
Shiites. In the face of these two radicalized interpretations of the Prophet
Mohammed's message, Islam definitively split, and the formation of viable state
units became impossible. In fact, the two sides have confronted one another
since the death of the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, Caliph Ali. There were those
who defended maintaining the "Caliphate" in the hands of the wealthy
merchants of the Quraysh clan [Sunnis], and the rest, who defended the
line of succession remaining within the family of the Prophet, with the
descendants of his daughter Fatima
who was married to Ali [Shiites]. This become a strong point of division. The
caliphate - a form of religious and secular government - was formally
abolished between 1923 and 1924, when the Turks consolidated their country as a
republic, and the Turkish monarch, the sultan, who was also caliph, lost his
titles. Since then, Islam has lacked a caliph in either the Sunni or Shiite
tradition.
This
division between Sunnis (traditionalists) and Shiites (supporters of Fatima and
Ali) has only deepened since their 8th century schism. Shiism, in contact with
Persian Zoroastrianism,Byzantine Christianity, and the Nestorian heresy, assumed
quite a different form from traditional Sunnism, observing
festivals, flagellation ceremonies, the worship of saints, relics and shrines
(tombs of saints, such as those in Karbala and Najaf, for example), in addition
to a total rejection of the caliph (where "caliph" is the title of
the "successor" sent by God, and who guards within himself all civil
and religious power).
Turkish
mastery over the Arabs from the 15th century up to 1918, and after that French
and British dominance, only deepened these divisions further, with the colonial powers selecting
the Sunnis, more inclined to accept demands and recognize the
authority of their colonial rulers, to form the core of pro-Western ruling
elites. Thus in Iraq after 1918, a small minority of Sunnis was organized by
Great Britain to govern the majority Shiite population. In this way, Sunnis united
with Western imperialist interests in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, and Saudi
Arabia, always resulting in cruel and highly repressive dictatorships.
In
the Baath Party regime under Saddam Hussein, there was a precarious arrangement
with Christians and a certain tolerance of Shiites, but in the final years of
Saddam's regime, the Shiites, many times supported and encouraged by the United
States, revolted against Saddam (a Sunni), and were brutally repressed, with
the widespread use of torture and thousands killed.
Posted By Worldmeets.US
Thus
the narrative that there is an incapacity to form a viable state due to
religious differences conceals the West's long and continuous intervention in
the Arab world and Western responsibility for pitting religious and ethnic
groups against each other, all for the purpose of facilitating foreign
domination (as it was, for example, in India under British rule, Rwanda under
Belgian colonialism, or Nigeria, again, under British rule). Thus the role of
imperialism and colonialism, its responsibility for local divisions, including
U.S. policy in the region, and before that the continuous colonial interventions
of Great Britain and France, which the Americans inherited, are precluded from
factual and moral responsibility for the current situation in the region.
The
main "cause" pointed at by the media, echoing statements and press
releases from the authorities in Washington, is the "incapacity" of Nouri
al-Maliki's government, a Shiite, to "unite" and lead a government with
Sunnis and Kurds.
Since
it regained its autonomy in the post-Saddam Hussein era, a coalition government
has functioned in Iraq - with Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis. This mixed
parliamentary government, based on a broad ethnic and religious coalition, sought
to give voice and rights to the majority of the Iraqi population, which consists
of Shiites, and offer controlled autonomy to the Kurds, who were persecuted and
killed in large numbers during the years of the Saddam dictatorship.
One
of the Shiite militias of the post-Saddam era was the "Dawa," a group that in addition to confronting al-Qaeda, faced the remnants of Saddam's Republican Guard and the Americans themselves,
who wanted a quick exit from Iraq after the 2003 invasion. Since 2006, the "Dawa" has transformed itself into a political party
under al-Maliki's leadership, which now governs Baghdad with a parliamentary
majority. It is in fact a broad but fragile coalition. Opposition to al-Maliki
is not centered in the Sunnis because of their exclusion, but in other Shiite
groups, including the Mahdi Army and its leader Muqtada
al-Sadr, who favors the creation of an Islamic regime
in the country.
Nouri
al-Maliki was long in exile in Syria (he was sentenced to death by Saddam), and
was strongly opposed to the United States. Al-Maliki opposes, in particular,
America's policy of reintegrating large numbers of cadres from the banned Baath
Party, the only party in power under Saddam, including the readmission of
soldiers loyal to Saddam, police accused of torture, and judges and civil
servants from the Baath Party who were involved in the brutal repression of the
Saddam era. In the American version, al-Maliki's refusal is due to his "Shiite"
sectarianism. In fact, the United States is proposing that the Iraq government,
which was reelected on January 30, 2014, accept and forgive members of Saddam's
government who actively participated in the brutal attacks against the Shiite
majority of their own people.
In
the name of "national unity," the United States, once again and in yet
another country, just as it did in Latin America, demands that criminals and violators
of human rights be brought to power and for the recent past to be forgotten.
Washington would much rather see in power men like Ahmed Chalabi,
prime minister between 2005 and 2006, a "client" of the CIA, and a
U.S. government pensioner. Chalabi, America's central
informant and so-called "man who prepared the invasion of Iraq," lost
his seat in parliament in the last election. Another name defended by the U.S.
is AyadAllawi, a secular leader, former member of the Baath
Party, and member of the transitional government after the U.S. occupation administration
and before the new free Iraqi government. It so happens that neither has the
votes to legitimize their hopes of forming a government. However, just as it
was in South Vietnam during the 1960s (with Cao Ky and Van Thieu), the U.S. insists on "naming" the
rulers of client states - despite the election results.
Al-Maliki,
accused in the past of organizing terrorist attacks against the United States
and France, also poses other "inconveniences" for Washington. First,
American demands of extraterritoriality for all of its personnel in Iraq,
including soldiers, police, and American "contractors" (in other
words, mercenaries), was refused by al-Maliki's cabinet. Thus, under pressure
from then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2009 and 2013), the United States
opted to improve and adorn Obama's "pacifist" foreign policy by
completely withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq. This was clearly an act of
blackmail: either the U.S. largely controlled Iraq's armed forces and police, with
the dominant inclusion of former Baath Party members, or they would leave.
Al-Maliki
opted to take the risk and maintain Iraq's shaky national sovereignty. In
addition to this, Baghdad contradicted the U.S. on two fundamental points of
Obama's Middle East policy. On the one hand, it tightened relations with Iran,
the largest Shiite-Muslim country ruled by a regime hostile to both Washington
and Israel, and on the other, it approached Russia, from which it purchased
high performance weapons (the former USSR was an Iraqi ally). Obama-Clinton
largely tried to prevent friendly relations among Baghdad, Tehran, and Moscow
(al-Maliki's Dawa Party also possessed strong ties
with Iran's Shiite clergy), which clearly sabotaged American attempts to
isolate Iran.
Likewise,
Baghdad charted a foreign policy independent of the so-called Arab Spring revolutions, especially in Syria. For Baghdad and Tehran,
the situation in Syria was and is completely different from the other "Springs."
Early on, they denounced the extensive foreign intervention from Qatar and
Saudi Arabia, with the support of the United States, Turkey and France, to
overthrow the Assad regime, comprised of a coalition of Shiites (Alawite) and Christians, which is nationalist in character, as
well as pan-Arab and anti-Israel. Tehran and Baghdad denounced from the outset foreign
intervention and the presence of mercenaries and volunteers from the Persian
Gulf, financed by Saudi Arabia and armed by England and France, aimed at overthrowing the Damascus regime.
In
Syria, a broad Sunni fundamentalist coalition formed that was extremely
intolerant and conservative in character: al-Qaeda, the al-Nusra
Front, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, called ISIL
in English.
This
coalition, in the
beginning manipulated by Saudi Arabia, with the capacity to unify a wide
swath of Arab territory under its authority and eliminate Iranian influence
in the region, became increasingly autonomous, and eventually adopted the ideals
of al-Qaeda, which was in the end overcome by the harshness and cruelty of the "Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant."
Meanwhile,
Al-Maliki caused great discomfort in Washington and Paris by supporting pan-Arab
and Shiite groups in Lebanon, where the "Dawa Party," a Lebanese cousin of Iraq's Dawa and also very close to Tehran, confronted American and
French troops in Lebanon.
Thus in
recent years, the Obama-Clinton Administration (2009-2013), drawing ever closer
to the American center-right and right, and to Saudi interests in America, has
adopted a clear anti-Iran, anti-Dawa, anti-Shiite stance,
based on a strategic triangle capable of ruling the Arab world centered in
Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. For the sake of this obsessively anti-Iranian
stance, Washington permitted the growth of Wahhabi fundamentalism (the
most radical branch of Sunni Islam, which executes Shiite clergymen and
destroys Shiism's holy places), and the formation of
a large army to which it gave a territorial basis for dominating regions of
Syria and Iraq - something that al-Qaeda never succeeded in doing.
Strangest of all, to sum up this
immense list of strategic, political, and anthropological mistakes made by
Washington, is that the death of Osama bin Laden strengthened and accelerated
the fight against the Baghdad government established by the American invasion
in 2003. The elimination of the charismatic leadership of bin Laden among his
followers and sympathizers allowed for the emergence of dissident forces such
as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and its proclamation of the "caliphate,"
opening up a new and explosive reality in the Middle East.
All told, the United States acted like Harry Potter upon obtaining his first magic wand: it liberated forces it didn't
understand or control. The crucial difference is that in this case, there is
clear risk of general chaos and a bitter end for the local peoples.
