Presidents Uribe and Chávez: Thanks to U.S. diplomatic cables

released by WikiLeaks, we now know that Uribe subscribed to

the adage, 'keep your friends close, and your enemies closer.'

 

 

El Espectador, Colombia

U.S. Cables: Colombia Played Nice with Hugo Chávez to Keep Open the Option of Infiltrating Venezuela

 

"The cable from the U.S. Embassy underlined that President Uribe had no illusions about Chávez and saw his anti-American approach as a serious problem … and makes it clear that Uribe's position, which placed an emphasis on working together rather than confrontation, still allowed him the option of carrying out military actions in Venezuela to protect Colombia from terrorist attack."

 

ANALYSIS, El Espectador

 

Translated by Anthony Figueroa

 

February 23, 2011

 

Colombia - El Espectador - Original Article (Spanish)

Addressing the U.N. General Assembly in September, Venezuela President Hugo Chávez says, 'It doesn't smell of sulfur any longer, it smells of hope. ... God should protect Obama from the bullets that killed Kennedy.'

 

PBS FRONTLINE SPECIAL: Who is Hugo Chávez? [watch in Spanish or English], June, 2008RealVideo

In November 2006, in addition to the outbreak of the para-politics scandal, there existed another great concern within the Uribe government: its relationship with Venezuela and that nation's president, Hugo Chávez. In a diplomatic cable sent from the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, the Colombian government's strategy at the time was clear: engage rather than confront Hugo Chávez, and take advantage of the open border between the countries to conduct operations against drug traffickers and terrorists that reside on Venezuelan territory.

 

[Editor's Note: Para-politics is a common phrase in Colombia, used to refer to the influence that right-wing paramilitaries wield on the government, and specifically on the former government of President Uribe].

 

The report to Washington underlined that President Uribe had no illusions about Chávez and saw his anti-American approach as a serious problem, but that Uribe preferred to manage the Venezuela president and even improve the atmosphere for bilateral relations with trade and energy projects in order to manage his behavior. The cable also highlighted Uribe's interest in collaborating with the United States - and not the Bolivarian Revolution - the latter being regarded as undemocratic in nature.

 

However, the cable from the U.S. Embassy in Bogota makes it clear that Uribe's position, which placed an emphasis on working together rather than confrontation, still allowed him the option of carrying out military actions in Venezuela to protect Colombia from terrorist attack; that is to say, to authorize covert operations against the FARC on the other side of the border when deemed appropriate, avoiding a crisis like the one that resulted from the capture of FARC Spokesman Rodrigo Granda.

 

In other words, the Embassy reported that Uribe would use this political space in his approach with Chávez to carry out, “clandestine cross-border operations against the FARC …," a strategy that the cable summed up with a quotation from former Presidential Advisor José Obdulio Gaviria, "We are perfect hypocrites." The report later notes that both Deputy Foreign Minister Camilo Reyes and [Commander of the Colombian National Police] General Óscar Naranjo said that Chávez' interest in the [Trans-Caribbean] gas pipeline led him to be more accommodating when it came to Colombia's security.

 

Also with regard to Venezuela, the cable offers a glimpse at the closeness, at the time, between President Uribe and the National Liberation Army [ELN]. The cable expressed concern about evidence that senior figures of the guerilla group were living openly in Caracas. The cable stated that even the ELN's military commander, Antonio García, spent most of his adult life between Europe and Venezuela. For that reason, presidential advisor José Obdulio Gaviria again stated that it was better to have Chávez on the inside rather than out and about, causing problems. 

 

[Editor's Note: The ELN is a smaller guerilla movement than the FARC - the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - but it is also left-wing. It has both clashed with and conducted joint operations with the FARC. Combined, the two groups are said to control between 30 and 40 percent of the country, which has been engaged in a civil war for decades. The notion outlined by the U.S. diplomatic cables discussed here, was to make a deal with the ELN in order to pressure the FARC into making concessions to the government.]

 

Another cable, dated a month earlier (October, 2006), includes a transcript of a meeting between former U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns and opinion leaders. It was reported that the general consensus was that it would be a strategic error for Colombia to enter into an arms race, for the weapons would eventually fall into the hands of Venezuela and squander money that could be used for social programs or security. The conclusion was that rather than triggering an arms race with Venezuela, the answer should be diplomatic.

 

In parallel with U.S. concern about the topic of Venezuela, the 2006 diplomatic cables raised the recurrent theme of the possibility of talks between the Uribe Government and the ELN. In fact, in November, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota issued a report, stating that the mediator between the Colombian government and the ELN, Moritz Ackerman, would go to Venezuela to deliver the Colombian proposal to the ELN. But guerrilla leader Antonio García asked him not to come, stating that President Hugo Chávez had asked him to keep a low profile while on Venezuelan soil.

 

The cable states that, according to Ackerman, the ELN wanted to move the conversation away from Cuba to avoid pressure from Cuban intelligence, as the Cubans didn't want the ELN to reach an agreement without the approval of the FARC. In the same report, the Embassy says that ELN chief Antonio García had expelled Ramiro Vargas from the negotiating team, after learning that he was passing information to the FARC and the Cubans; and that four prominent Colombians were willing to join the process to counter concerns that the guarantors were too leftist.

 

President Chávez tells his people to 'prepare for war' with Colombia

and the U.S., during his weekly TV show, Hello, President, Nov. 2009.

CLICK HERE OR CLICK PHOTO TO WATCH

 

SEE ALSO ON THIS:  

Ultimas Noticias, Venezuela: Chávez: 'Prepare for War ... Colombia Now in U.S. Hands'  

The Times, U.K.: Chávez tells Venezuela Troops to 'Prepare for War' with Colombia

El Universal, Venezuela: 'Peace Prize' Winner Should Close All U.S. Military Bases  

Semana, Colombia: U.S. Military Bases are Alright, Under One Condition ...

La Jornada, Mexico: The Militarization of Latin America: Obama Already 'Ahead of Bush'  

Adnkronos, Italy: Chávez Lauds Oliver Stone; Wants to 'Help' Obama  

Clarin, Argentina: Resurrected U.S. Fourth Fleet Creates Suspicion in South America    

O Globo, Brazil: U.S. Navy Shows That What America Can Do, Brazil Can Do As Well

La Jornada, Mexico: U.S. Navy 'Resurrects' Fourth Fleet to Patrol Latin America

 

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Finally, the same diplomatic cable revealed that Norway had offered to finance talks between Uribe and the ELN, but only if the guerrilla movement was "irreversibly" committed to peace. In addition, the U.S. Embassy in Colombia reported that the ELN wanted to open a direct channel to Washington and asked mediator Moritz Ackerman that he write a letter to the ambassador. According to the cable, the proposal was that the ELN would cooperate in the battle against drug trafficking.   

Posted by WORLDMEETS.US

 

Since early 2006, the U.S. Embassy considered its contacts with the ELN, established during a pre-negotiation dialogue in Havana, to be important. It was estimated that 4,000 people could be potentially demobilized, to say nothing of how the process would put pressure on the FARC, legitimize the peace process and put an end to hundreds of kidnappings. However, the cable of February 2006 made it clear that the Uribe government was not optimistic. The cable relates that the Embassy was concerned that any further concessions to the ELN would also have to be given to the [right-wing] paramilitaries. 

 

That expectation was not too different from what was in the country as a whole. In the same cable, Uribe's re-election is spoken of as being synonymous with four-and-a-half years of partnership. While it applauded the number of extraditions and the ongoing war on drug trafficking, the cable also warned of a third generation of illegal "druggists” in the armed forces, modeled after the original ideologues and organizers of past military organizers. In regard to the FACR, the view was that it appeared weak, but that it would play along with the humanitarian exchange, which in fact happened.

 

[The author refers to the 2008 exchange that resulted in the release by the FARC of former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt].

 

In the cable, the Colombians admit to frustration with their relations with the U.S. because, among other things, they hadn't received more Blackhawk helicopters, nor had the U.S. permitted them to use extradition as a tool to negotiate with the [right-wing] paramilitaries and drug traffickers. There is also a special comment about the relentless pressure Uribe had been putting on the army, warning that the military could be “burned at the stake,” or at the very least, distance itself from the civilian leadership.

 

The year 2006 came to an end with cables in October and December, which first reported tensions between Antonio García and Colombia's Peace Commissioner Luis Camilo Restrepo, and that the ELN was ready for a ceasefire and to release hostages in exchange for government assistance to the displaced. Later, it was reported that mediator Moritz Ackerman said that the ELN was not going to suspend contacts, but that it was waiting to see how much weaker the government would be after the para-politics scandal. But as time passed, the partnership seemed to drift further apart.

 

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[Posted by WORLDMEETS.US March 4, 10:15pm]

 

 







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