Presidents Uribe and
Chávez: Thanks to U.S. diplomatic cables
released by WikiLeaks, we now
know that Uribe subscribed to
the adage, 'keep your friends close, and
your enemies closer.'
El Espectador, Colombia
U.S. Cables: Colombia Played Nice with Hugo Chávez to Keep Open the Option of Infiltrating Venezuela
"The
cable from the U.S. Embassy underlined that President Uribe had no illusions
about Chávez and saw his anti-American approach as a serious problem … and
makes it clear that Uribe's position, which placed an emphasis on working
together rather than confrontation, still allowed him the option of carrying
out military actions in Venezuela to protect Colombia from terrorist
attack."
Addressing the U.N. General Assembly in September, Venezuela President Hugo Chávez says, 'It doesn't smell of sulfur any longer, it smells of hope. ... God should protect Obama from the bullets that killed Kennedy.'
In
November 2006, in addition to the outbreak of the para-politics
scandal, there existed another great concern within the Uribe government:
its relationship with Venezuela and that nation's president, Hugo Chávez. In
a diplomatic cable sent from the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, the Colombian
government's strategy at the time was clear: engage rather than confront Hugo
Chávez, and take advantage of the open border between the countries to conduct
operations against drug traffickers and terrorists that reside on Venezuelan
territory.
[Editor's Note: Para-politics is a common phrase in Colombia, used to
refer to the influence that right-wing paramilitaries wield on the government, and specifically on the former
government of President Uribe].
The
report to Washington underlined that President Uribe had no illusions about
Chávez and saw his anti-American approach as a serious problem, but that Uribe
preferred to manage the Venezuela president and even improve the atmosphere for
bilateral relations with trade and energy projects in order to manage his
behavior. The cable also highlighted Uribe's interest in collaborating with the
United States - and not the Bolivarian Revolution - the latter being regarded
as undemocratic in nature.
However,
the cable from the U.S. Embassy in Bogota makes it clear that Uribe's position,
which placed an emphasis on working together rather than confrontation, still
allowed him the option of carrying out military actions in Venezuela to protect
Colombia from terrorist attack; that is to say, to authorize covert operations
against the FARC on the other side of the border when deemed appropriate, avoiding
a crisis like the one that resulted from the capture of FARC Spokesman Rodrigo Granda.
In
other words, the Embassy reported that Uribe would use this political space in
his approach with Chávez to carry out, “clandestine cross-border operations
against the FARC …," a strategy that the cable summed up with a quotation
from former Presidential Advisor José Obdulio Gaviria, "We are perfect
hypocrites." The report later notes that both Deputy Foreign Minister Camilo
Reyes and [Commander of the Colombian National Police] General Óscar Naranjo
said that Chávez' interest in the [Trans-Caribbean]
gas pipeline led him to be more accommodating when it came to Colombia's
security.
Also
with regard to Venezuela, the cable offers a glimpse at the closeness, at the
time, between President Uribe and the National Liberation Army [ELN]. The cable expressed
concern about evidence that senior figures of the guerilla group were living
openly in Caracas. The cable stated that even the ELN's military commander, Antonio
García, spent most of his adult life between Europe and Venezuela. For that
reason, presidential advisor José Obdulio Gaviria again stated that it was
better to have Chávez on the inside rather than out and about, causing problems.
[Editor's
Note: The ELN is a smaller guerilla movement than the FARC - the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia - but it is also left-wing. It has both clashed with
and conducted joint operations with the FARC. Combined, the two groups are said
to control between 30 and 40 percent of the country, which has been engaged in
a civil war for decades. The notion outlined by the U.S. diplomatic cables
discussed here, was to make a deal with the ELN in order to pressure the FARC
into making concessions to the government.]
Another
cable, dated a month earlier (October, 2006), includes a transcript of a
meeting between former U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns and opinion
leaders. It was reported that the general consensus was that it would be a
strategic error for Colombia to enter into an arms race, for the weapons would
eventually fall into the hands of Venezuela and squander money that could be
used for social programs or security. The conclusion was that rather than
triggering an arms race with Venezuela, the answer should be diplomatic.
In
parallel with U.S. concern about the topic of Venezuela, the 2006 diplomatic
cables raised the recurrent theme of the possibility of talks between the Uribe
Government and the ELN. In fact, in November, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota issued
a report, stating that the mediator between the Colombian government and the
ELN, Moritz Ackerman, would go to Venezuela to deliver the Colombian proposal
to the ELN. But guerrilla leader Antonio García asked him not to come, stating
that President Hugo Chávez had asked him to keep a low profile while on
Venezuelan soil.
The
cable states that, according to Ackerman, the ELN wanted to move the
conversation away from Cuba to avoid pressure from Cuban intelligence, as the
Cubans didn't want the ELN to reach an agreement without the approval of the
FARC. In the same report, the Embassy says that ELN chief Antonio García had
expelled Ramiro Vargas from the negotiating team, after learning that he was passing
information to the FARC and the Cubans; and that four prominent Colombians were willing
to join the process to counter concerns that the guarantors were too leftist.
President
Chávez tells his people to 'prepare for war' with Colombia
and
the U.S., during his weekly TV show, Hello, President, Nov. 2009.
Finally,
the same diplomatic cable revealed that Norway had offered to finance talks
between Uribe and the ELN, but only if the guerrilla movement was
"irreversibly" committed to peace. In addition, the U.S. Embassy in
Colombia reported that the ELN wanted to open a direct channel to Washington
and asked mediator Moritz Ackerman that he write a letter to the ambassador.
According to the cable, the proposal was that the ELN would cooperate in the battle
against drug trafficking.
Posted by WORLDMEETS.US
Since
early 2006, the U.S. Embassy considered its contacts with the ELN, established
during a pre-negotiation dialogue in Havana, to be important. It was estimated that
4,000 people could be potentially demobilized, to say nothing of how the
process would put pressure on the FARC, legitimize the peace process and put an
end to hundreds of kidnappings. However, the cable of February 2006 made it
clear that the Uribe government was not optimistic. The cable relates that the
Embassy was concerned that any further concessions to the ELN would also have
to be given to the [right-wing] paramilitaries.
That
expectation was not too different from what was in the country as a whole. In
the same cable, Uribe's re-election is spoken of as being synonymous with
four-and-a-half years of partnership. While it applauded the number of
extraditions and the ongoing war on drug trafficking, the cable also warned of
a third generation of illegal "druggists” in the armed forces, modeled
after the original ideologues and organizers of past military organizers. In
regard to the FACR, the view was that it appeared weak, but that it would play
along with the
humanitarian exchange, which in fact happened.
In
the cable, the Colombians admit to frustration with their relations with the U.S.
because, among other things, they hadn't received more Blackhawk helicopters,
nor had the U.S. permitted them to use extradition as a tool to negotiate with
the [right-wing] paramilitaries and drug traffickers. There is also a special comment
about the relentless pressure Uribe had been putting on the army, warning that the
military could be “burned at the stake,” or at the very least, distance itself
from the civilian leadership.
The
year 2006 came to an end with cables in October and December, which first
reported tensions between Antonio García and Colombia's Peace Commissioner Luis
Camilo Restrepo, and that the ELN was ready for a ceasefire and to release
hostages in exchange for government assistance to the displaced. Later, it was
reported that mediator Moritz Ackerman said that the ELN was not going to
suspend contacts, but that it was waiting to see how much weaker the government
would be after the para-politics scandal. But as time passed, the partnership
seemed to drift further apart.
