"The
message of Kim Jong-il's death is clear: Under Kim Jong-un, the system based on
an all-powerful leader will no longer be possible. … Before his rein has even
begun, it is doomed by conflicting problems: first, the domestic conflict that would
be created by military opposition to marketization; and second, substantial and
growing civilian displeasure with having a man of 28 years running the country."
What will become of Kim
Jong-un? Once can try and predict North Korea's future from a number of angles,
but when all is said and done, the core issue is the fate of Kim Jong-un.
Following in the footsteps of
Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un is the "heir to the throne,"
as it were. He's hasn't succeeded his father as general secretary of the party
[the Korean
Workers' Party], chairman of the National
Defense Commission or leading military man. But nevertheless, he is the new
supreme leader of the country. As a general in the Chosun People’s Army
and member of the Korean
Workers' Party Central Committee, Kim Jong-un is now the leading authority
in North Korea.
But unlike Kim Jong-un, after
Kim Il-sung died, it was as military chief that Kim Jong-il took control of
North Korea. Kim Jong-il too, of course, was heir to the throne. Only after one
understands this system, which entails vastly different transfers of power than
one is accustomed to in South Korea, America or even China, is it possible to
predict what lies in store for the North Korean system.
In North Korea, there are
three prerequisites for maintaining control: leadership of the Party (as Korean
Workers' Party general secretary), leadership of the state apparatus (chairman
of the National Defense Commission) and being supreme leader of the military (as
military chief of staff). So it is crucial not to downplay the importance of being
named successor to the current leader since this is the only path to a
relatively easy transition of total power over the state.
The next most important
position is secretary general of the party. This position is the most important
rung on the ladder toward wielding authority over party and citizens. To put it
bluntly, it is no longer strictly necessary to become chairman of the National
Defense Commission. In fact, this is likely of little importance. Most "experts"
make predictions on the future of North Korea without properly understanding
this key point.
In accordance with Article 21
of the revised Chosun Workers' Party regulations, Kim Jong-un will
automatically become party general secretary. Moreover, Article 22 says that
the chairman of the Central Military Commission, a position that oversees all
military issues, is reserved for party's general secretary. Up to now, many elements
of the media have spent their time wondering what Kim Jong-un's status will be and
how the transfer of power will take place.
To begin at the end, Kim
Jong-un will have absolutely no trouble when it comes to the transfer of power.
There are peripheral bits of interest, such as what kind of propaganda and
events the authorities will use to sell the power transfer, but these are merely
side issues. Only when reporters and analysts get away from focusing on whether
or not a smooth power transfer can take place will they comprehend the big
picture.
Media can only report
accurately and in the best interests of the public if they stick to the core
issues. Only then can the public get a proper sense of the future of the two
Koreas and the Korean Peninsula as a whole. The future of South Korea is not
well served by a foolish or stuck-in-the-mud media.
The most pressing question to
ponder now is who will become the head of the Organization
and Guidance Department. While waiting in the wings, this was a position Kim
Jong-il filled, and it was one that allowed him to shore up his status as party
and state leader before Kim Il-sung passed away.
Ever since Kim Jong-il became
party general secretary, the Guidance Department position has been vacant. Or
to put it another way, Kim Jong-il filled both posts. But now that Kim Jong-un is
leader, he will have to skip over the job of party organizing secretary
straight to the general secretary's office. What is therefore of interest here
is whether he does or does not fill the post of chief of the Organization and
Guidance Department; and if he does dispense with the post - who will fill it and
when. To understand North Korea's power dynamics, one must grasp these issues.
So if the transfer of power
to Kim Jong-un is a fait accompli, then what critical issues are left to
decide? Of course it is the question of Kim Jong-un's leadership ability - and
there is plenty of doubt about that. The fate of 24 million North Koreans depends on his capacity to lead the country. The future of the entire Korean
Peninsula and South Korean policy toward the North depends on his leadership.
No matter how much China and the U.S. hope for North Korean stability under Kim
Jong-un, they have no capacity whatsoever to manage internal problems that
arise in North Korea.
One needs only the slightest
familiarity with history to understand that major problems almost always develop
from within. As much as China would like to prevent the collapse of the Kim
Jong-un regime, what capacity will it really have in the face of an explosion derived
from North Korea's contradictions?
Furthermore, no matter how great
China’s influence over the Pyongyang leadership may be, will Beijing truly be
able to order around its new leaders as if they were serfs? Kim Jong-il had
some fitting words of wisdom on this point: “One embedded Soviet or Chinese dog
is more dangerous than ten Yankee imperial agents.”
So the potential influence of
China over North Korea is limited to areas of the economy, providing a shield
against the United States and South Korea, and providing it with diplomatic
support. It is inconceivable that ideological or political support will ever
enter into the equation.
Moving on, Kim Jong-un has no
choice but to follow the path laid down by his father Kim Jong-il and his
grandfather, Kim Il-sung. Because of this he will have to continue upholding
the torch of Juche thought [self
reliance] and Songun ideology
[military-first]. The country’s annual New Year’s address will almost certainly
consist of strident calls for the entire party, military and citizenry to serve
the "great leader" Kim Jong-un like they did his father and
grandfather before him.
So for these reasons if for no
others, there is little basis to believe that under Kim Jong-un, pro-China factions
will guide the new North Korean leadership.
So the message of
Kim Jong-il's death is clear: The class-system dictatorship established when Kim
Il-sung seized power in 1948 and which has carried on for 63 years will soon reach
its end. If, however, the Kim Jong-un regime were to seriously address the issue the
North's chronic hunger problem, it would win him significant goodwill.
Under Kim Jong-un, the system
based on an all-powerful leader will no longer be possible. The system of absolute
dedication to the father Kim Il-sung and his successor Kim Jong-il is all but at
an end. Although he is referred to as the "leader", there really isn't
anyone that Kim Jong-un can absolutely command. To maintain the system of
absolute leadership of the masses that has existed up to now, Kim Jong-un would
need to maintain the strict top down hierarchy that his father and grandfather
fashioned.
However, the people that Kim
Jong-un would hope to lead have already left him for the market. For most people
in Hamkyung, Yangkang, Jagang and Pyongan provinces, private markets has become
the central means of survival. In the minds of these people, images of a
father-like leader and a loving, caring, maternal Worker's Party have already
disappeared without a trace.
All Kim Jong-un has left in
his control is Pyongyang's privileged class, and even they are tied to him out
of concern for their own interests rather than any ideological solidarity. It
is a marriage of convenience. Naturally, these people aren't all going to
suddenly disappear, but if and when they do, Kim Jong-un will be left without
anyone to command.
Of course, Kim Jong-il was no
better when it came to leading the masses. His style of leadership was to feed
people propaganda with one hand and clobber them with the other. Even his death
was propaganda, stylized to sound as if he had died on a train while working in
the interests of the people. It is scarcely believable that there are still elements
in the media and other fools who fail to recognize this as simply old school
communist propaganda.
Ever since Kim Il-sung died
17 years ago, the people of North Korea have lived in a purgatory between life
and death. Those who have survived have done so by absolutely any means
necessary, and it is only now that they have found a way to survive on their
own. And like anything of value, people don't easily dispense with what they
have worked so hard to achieve.
So if Kim Jong-un truly wants
to lead, he will have to choose between winning the war against private markets,
which would include restoring the top-down system of leader-party-people; or
moving to a system that tolerates private markets. He must choose one. If he
picks the first, he will have to lock down North Korea and kill, purge and beat
a great number of people. But if he chooses the latter, he will have to
establish a leadership circle based on reform and liberation - and create a
master-plan for realizing such goals while dealing one by one with every
obstacle that gets in his way. Naturally for that to happen, the people of
North Korea would need to go along with his leadership.
Unfortunately for him,
neither of these options is available now. As far as the first option of
maintaining the current arrangements, he can't very well shut North Korea's
doors and call everyone back inside. As for the second option, the people have lost
the reasons they once may have had to blindly follow his leadership.
Given these facts, the only
sensible conclusion to draw is that the Kim Jong-un system cannot long survive,
for it has major structural problems. Before his rein has even begun, it is
doomed by a set of conflicting problems: first, the domestic conflict that would
be created by military opposition to marketization; and second, substantial and
growing civilian displeasure with having a man of 28 years running the country.
Thirteen years ago the South
Korean administration of Kim
Dae-jung established the Sunshine Policy, believing
at the time that North Korea had no option other than to pursue liberation and
reform, and that all South Korea had to do was give them a little nudge to make
it happen. In the end, South Korea lost far more than it gained from this inaccurate
and premature analysis.
The after-effects of the
Sunshine Policy are now more visible in the South than the North. Although it
came a little late, last year's decision by the Lee Myung Bak Administration to
move from a policy of separation but peaceful coexistence with North Korea to
one of peaceful reunification was a step in the right direction.
From now on, the key tenets
of North Korea policy need to be "engagement" and "enlargement."
The categories in which they can "engage" and "enlarge"
upon are information, economy, politics and the military. I will deal with
these more specifically in my next column.
The meaning of Kim Jong-il's death
is deep and profound, not only for the situation on the ground in the North,
but for Seoul's relations with it. One of the greatest stumbling blocks to progress
on the peninsula for the achievement of greater freedom, democracy and peace in
Asia and around the world has been removed with the death of Kim Jong-il. But despite
that, it seems that most people fail to realize the significance of his passing.
Nevertheless, there is
something I would like to point out to the Lee Myung Bak government. In August
2008, when Kim Jong-il was first struck down by a stroke, the Daily NK
recommended on numerous occasions that it was now a good time to begin serious
preparations for the post-Kim Jong-il era. We also made some suggestions about
how to make that happen.
But yesterday, the Chosun
Ilbo carried news that the government is asserting that now is a new opportunity
to begin inter-Korean relations all over again. What do they mean a "new opportunity"
to begin again? Does that mean that for the three years since Kim Jong-il was
struck down by a stroke, the government has done nothing in the way of planning
for this eventuality?
Most Koreans would have thought
that the government had plans for the day Kim Jong-il was out of the picture.
When reporters asked what this would mean for the future of our North Korea
policy, most people would have expected the government to say, “We have long
had a plan in place for life after Kim Jong-il, so just go about your
business.” People took for granted that Seoul's response would be that such a
plan would come into effect after allowing for the situation in North Korea to
settle down.
Posted
by WORLDMEETS.US
Instead, the government came
out with bizarre talk of a complete reboot for inter-Korean relations. How can this
be taken as anything but a sign that the government has absolutely no idea what
to do now that Kim Jong-il has left the scene?
Why is it that ordinary
people are always the ones to face the consequences when those in power decide
that there is something other than the will of the people that they would
rather follow? Why have young people braved the dark streets and cold for the
sake of North Korean human rights, yet the government can’t seem to do anything
right when it comes to the North Korean
Human Rights Act? Why is it that other countries pass laws on North Korean
human rights while ours cannot? How will it be possible to make progress when
this is the attitude of the Republic of Korea? It's an unfortunate fact that
the end of this year has left us with too many people in the National Assembly
that are passed their use-by date.
