Progress, But Bush
Era Lingers at Iran Nuclear Talks
"It
was then that Iran was made to feel guilty until proven innocent. ... It remains
to be seen if there really is anything new to U.S. policy on this subject. But
from a technical point of view, it's clear from the talks in Vienna that things
could turn out well."
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Secretary of State Clinton in Moscow, October 13. It seems that the Russians aren't yet on board for increased sanctions on Tehran.
MOSCOW: It seems like
everything went well. Except for the fact that only experts in nuclear weapons
and nuclear energy fully understand what happened over the past two days, at
the Vienna headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency. These
experts, representing the United States, Russia, France and Iran, discussed key
but very confidential aspects of what is known as "the Iranian nuclear
problem."
It's not known what, in fact,
they have agreed to. All that's clear is that, according to IAEA Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei, the negotiations were successful and he himself followed
up by drafting an agreement that must be endorsed by all four governments on Friday.
Then the IAEA Board of Governors will have to weigh in and ratify the document
at their next meeting to be held in November.
The document in question
seems to be exclusively concerned with technical aspects of the agreement that
was reached on October 1 at a meeting in Geneva between Iran and the "Iran
six" regarding the export to third countries of Iran's uranium for
enrichment (primarily Russia).
Contained in this procedure
is the key to resolving the Iranian nuclear problem. If Tehran agrees and
doesn't renege on previous agreements - on Friday or later - it would confirm that
Iran's nuclear program is indeed peaceful. Then formal negotiations with Iran
can continue, as ElBaradei has said.
In question is 3,300 pounds of
low-enriched uranium (approximately 3.5 percent purity), which was enriched to
that point by Iran in its own centrifuges. Nuclear bombs, however, require highly-enriched
uranium. But the inertia of the old era - the era of George W. Bush - still
lingers. It was then that Iran was made to feel guilty until proven innocent,
and the thinking was that Iran shouldn't even possess the capability to make low-enriched
uranium for fear that it would be too easy for it to enrich to weapons grade.
Tehran offered to export part
of its enrichment cycle outside the country - to Russia, for example (this was,
in fact, Moscow's idea). There it would be enriched to almost 20 percent purity,
which is sufficient to for nuclear energy generation - but not enough for a
bomb. It would then be returned to Iran. On October 1 in Geneva, Tehran generally
agreed to this option (which it consistently refused during the Bush Administration).
In Vienna, all that were discussed were the details of this.
The next items on the agenda (over
the next few days) is an IAEA inspection of Iran's second nuclear facility - near
Qum, the existence of which was made public just prior to October 1. The Iranians
have said this plant is related to medical research and has nothing to do with
nuclear weapons. So it’s possible this issue could be removed from the agenda.
Now the question is - what was
all the fuss about? Because the long history of global crisis over the nuclear
programs of Iran (and North Korea) is replete with many details understood by few
others than nuclear specialists. And, of course, specialists in public
relations.
For example, take a
recent article in The Washington Post. It starts of without malice by
saying, "Since you're probably not a regular reader of the trade
publication Nucleonics Week … " The article goes on to say that
readers of this nuclear industry publication have just been told that Iran's entire
stockpile of low-enriched uranium is contaminated with molybdenum - which was
caused by inadequate equipment at Iran's Isfahan plant. And now this
contaminated uranium can't be enriched any further - to weapons grade or any other
grade, for that matter. In other words, Iran needs international cooperation - and
it needs it a great deal.
This suddenly casts the talk about
war plans and Iran's military capabilities in an entirely different light, no
matter how much Tehran has frightened its neighbors.
Then, in this same U.S. media,
a discussion has resumed on an American
intelligence estimate from 2007. At the time, one recalls, the intelligence
services reported that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. This
report at once froze the activities of the previous U.S. administration with
regard to Iran. And although the word "sanctions" was pronounced with
the same regularity thereafter, it was done without the previous relish.
Now the conversation in the
U.S. is that this assessment should be revised negatively - at least because U.S.
intelligence somehow missed the plant at Qum. But a definitive reply is
something Washington doesn't want to give. Confirming or denying the ineffectiveness
of one's intelligence is no simple matter. But the question remains, did the previous
U.S. administration have accurate information about Iran, and was this the
right information for making an assessment?
And then there was an article
by Richard N. Haass. Haass is a very serious man and his name is legend: he's president
of the Council on Foreign Relations - and his influence on the Council is also
legendary. In the very same issue of the Washington Post, Haass wrote
that the policy toward Iran should be geared to gradually improve the regime in
Tehran. And that Israel, by constantly threatening to attack Iran, only tightens
the hold of the Ayatollahs and creates chaos in the Middle East. It'll be
interesting to see whether this works.
It's possible to conclude from
all this that public relations and propaganda have gone beyond the limits of
decency and prevented people from seeing reality. Moreover, all parties - Iran,
America, and Israeli - are responsible for this type of "information
support." Moreover, all sides took part - Iranian, American and Israeli. The
upshot of all this is that in Vienna, the Iranian smoke screen has yet to be
fully dissipated - but the process is moving forward nicely.
And as in the case of North
Korea, the crux of the matter with Iran today is not whether the U.S. and its
allies are trying to force an "evil government" to abandon its
nuclear ambitions through sanctions - and that Russia and China might use their
status on the U.N. Security Council to scuttle them. The gist of it seems to be
that through false accusations, threats, war or any other means, the U.S. wanted
to change regimes they regarded as evil. This led to a dire situation: Iran (and
North Korea) may have been frightened into actually starting nuclear weapons
programs. And to be sure, this intimidated their neighbors.
It remains to be seen if
there really is anything new to U.S. policy on this subject. But from a technical
point of view, it's clear from the talks in Vienna that things could turn out
well.
