In Syria and Beyond, U.S. is a Hostage of its Own Power (Gazeta, Russia)
"Neither Iraq, nor Afghanistan, nor Libya, provide any
evidence that intervention leads to problem solving and effective resolution. Nevertheless,
it is all being repeated again. George Bush believed in the capacity of force
to transform the world; Barack Obama does not. Yet both behave identically, bereft
of ideas and with no counterweight that would otherwise compel the Americans to
restrain themselves. It is as if America is hostage to its own power, with everyone
waiting for confirmation of its never-ending capacity to act."
Writing
about the latest war in the Middle East is a bore. The plot doesn't repeat
itself precisely, but it contains the same set of elements. Only the layout
varies. The accusatory pathos and metal in the voices of Western politicians
has become so routine, it is easy to predict when voices will again tremble
with righteous indignation. The mechanism has been simplified and accelerated.
Given that everything is so clear, there is less time wasted on ritual
diplomatic dances like there were ten years ago in Iraq, or even two-and-a-half
years ago in Libya. At the [U.N.] Security Council, a resolution on the use of
force has been proposed only so it can be formally vetoed, and the amoral
obstructionism of Russia and China used as a justification to act without U.N.
authorization.
There
are no illusions as to the course of events to follow. A strike is inevitable -
the entire propaganda machine is already laying out the rationale.
The
verdict of the U.N. inspectors is unimportant here, although it may serve as
the formal pretext for the start of operations. After all, members of the
inspection team are, according to their mandate, entitled to speak to only one thing
- whether or not chemical weapons were used in Syria. However, no one is
contesting the fact they were used, including Damascus itself, and the question
of who did it is beyond the expertise of the U.N. specialists. So as soon as
the inspectors announce their evident use, President Obama will
communicate an order to carry out retributive action. He cautioned last year
that the use of chemical warfare agents would constitute a "red line,"
and the Assad regime's responsibility for this inhumane act is just taken for
granted by default - who else could it be?
Several
scenarios have been discussed, with both the U.S. and Great Britain insisting
that no one intends to topple Bashar al-Assad; their
purpose - retribution for crimes against humanity. However, by engaging in
combat operations, the United States and its allies are resigning themselves to
following a predetermined logic from which there will be no retreat. If a
superpower takes action against a regime considered criminal, ending it without
having attained a result, i.e. the elimination of that regime, is out of the
question. Prestige would suffer - and others would lose their fear.
The
first strike may be concentrated, but time-limited, to cause maximum damage to
infrastructure and demoralize official Damascus. Furthermore, hopes will mostly
rest with the rebels - they will have to take advantage of the situation and
turn the tide of war in their favor. They will be provided military aid thanks
to a principled decision on the matter taken by Europe and the U.S. early in
the summer. If that isn't enough, and essentially the Syrian Army has thus far
proven its viability, then it will fall to Western forces to continue not just
its strikes, but permanent air support, as in Libya. It cannot be stopped - the
deeper the engagement, the keener the need to secure victory.
In
the history of "humanitarian interventions," which began soon after
the end of the Cold War, there have been several scenarios and endings.
The
Iraq variation - full scale occupation of the country, can be excluded straight
away. No one is prepared for that, as the risks and the expenditures are too high.
The most brutal variation is Libya, where an operation that began with the
slogan "responsibility to protect" almost immediately turned into a
bloody campaign for regime change. That is a possibility, although in Syria's
case its own peculiarities are enough to weigh down both the action itself, and
what comes of it.
There
is the example of Bosnia in the early 1990s, where the foundations were laid
for everything that has come to be considered "conflict resolution." Namely,
powerful external forces choose the "right" side in a civil conflict
and begin actively supporting it, suppressing all others involved. In Bosnia,
NATO used force to coerce the Serbs into greater compliance and concessions. As
a result of pressure from the U.S. and its allies, the Dayton Agreement was
signed, creating present day Bosnia and Herzegovina based on externally-imposed
conditions.
Theoretically,
it can be assumed that the intimidatory action toward
Damascus is in pursuit of the same objective - to lead those involved in the
conflict to the infamous "Geneva
II," with the ruling regime weakened and ideally without Assad. In
practice, however, this isn't feasible. There were three parties engaged in the
Bosnian War, represented
by three leaders - Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian Alija
Izetbegovic. They were able to come to an agreement, and most importantly, ensure
its implementation. The layout in Syria is much more complex. The opposition is
not a singular party to negotiation. The coherently laid out Dayton Agreement
could not be duplicated here, and even if one began gathering all the parties around
a table, even the Americans couldn't deal with the discord.
This
leaves the 1999 Kosovo
campaign, where a combination of aviation war and guerilla actions in the
autonomous province forced Belgrade to withdraw. It is worth remembering,
though, that NATO was very nearly trapped. After several weeks of bombing, the
Yugoslav Army was damaged but not seriously weakened. Gradually, the alliance's
own munitions ran out. Global public opinion grew ever more negative - the
incessant bombardment of a European country - by no means for the last time -
by an international coalition many times more powerful, looked unsightly. The
question arose as to the need for ground forces in Kosovo, which filled a
majority of the allies with horror.
Then
Moscow came to the rescue. At the request of Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin sent his
special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin to Yugoslavia, who threatened Milosevic with an
end to Russian support, and along with Finnish President MarttiAhtisaari, urged him to stop resisting and get out of
Kosovo. If not for Russian pressure, Belgrade may have procrastinated and,
taking advantage of NATO's zeitnot,
would have secured more acceptable conditions.
Posted By
Worldmeets.US
In
Syria, Russia cannot be relied upon to help out should the United States and its
allies get stuck there. From the point of view of the Russian leadership, every
time Moscow has acted on a Western appeal and helped resolve a political
problem, no good has come of it. In the latest example, Libya, the decision of
Dmitry Medvedev not to block a U.N. resolution on the use of force against
Tripoli is now almost officially recognized as a mistake.
Be
that as it may, having begun to participate in this campaign, the U.S. will not
be able to extricate itself without displacing Bashar
al-Assad - and considerations of prestige will outweigh any doubts of those apprehensive
about the chaos following regime change. There are no plans as such for reconstructing
Syria without Assad - yet no one can stop this now. Only later will they think
about what to do next.
The
most dispiriting part of the modern history of conflicts (principally in the
Middle East) is a growing sense that using force has become not the last
resort, when all other possibilities have been exhausted, but a magic wand for when
it isn't clear what to do at all.
Neither
Iraq, nor Afghanistan, nor Libya, provide any evidence that intervention leads
to problem solving and effective resolution. Nevertheless, it is all being
repeated again. George Bush believed in the capacity of force to transform the
world; Barack Obama does not. Yet both behave identically, bereft of ideas and with
no counterweight that would otherwise compel the Americans to restrain
themselves. It is as if America is hostage to its own power, with everyone waiting
for confirmation of its never-ending capacity to act. Hence the cycle will play
out again, until or unless some very rude shock forces an urgent change in
tactics. Or until there emerges a force serious enough for the United States to
have to reckon with.
*Fyodor Lukyanov is Chief Editor for Russia in Global Affairs.
