Offer Putin Crimea in Exchange for Kosovo
Recognition (Der Standard, Austria)
"The West has something to offer
Putin: international recognition of Crimea's return to Russia. This way it
could demand that this process be a legal and orderly procedure based on a supervised
referendum. ... In return, Russia could finally recognize the independence of
Kosovo, whose succession followed the same principle of self-determination of
peoples and ethnic groups as Russia's Crimea policy."
Into the fyring pan: Ukraine's interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk in Brussels, March 6. Yatsenyuk says the vote by Crimea lawmakers to secede from Ukraine and join Russia is illegal - but is there anything he or the West can do about it?
Instead of noisily insisting on principle, the West will
have to negotiate with Moscow
For a century, the politics of power or realpolitik
and the politics of principle and values have been opposites in international
relations. While Europeans are committed to the latter and the U.S. has wavered
between the two depending on the threat, the primacy of realpolitikhas prevailed in Russia since the days of Stalin - as one can see
from Vladimir Putin's actions toward Ukraine.
The world has room for both. However, one thing is
clear: anyone who reacts to the politics of power by insisting on principles like
international law - has already lost. A realpolitik politician like Putin is not impressed by his
opponent's convictions or the symbolic steps they take, such as being excluded from
the G8.
Realpolitik-oriented experts can therefore only shake their heads over how the U.S.
and Europe initially reacted to Russian policies. Loud expressions of
indignation and empty threats only give the impression of powerlessness and prevent
solutions more closely aligned to Western and Ukrainian interests, and Putin
know that a policy of ostracism won't last, because the West needs Russia to
deal with other conflicts.
How would a realpolitik politician advise the U.S. president and E.U.
leaders? First of all, don't fight for something of little practical value that
cannot be achieved. That's Crimea. Russia has much greater strategic interests
there than the West or even Ukraine (keyword: Black Sea Fleet), and can easily impose
its authority.
Even under international law, the Russian position is
not entirely illegitimate. Ultimately, the peninsula has a Russian majority and
was was only “gifted” to Ukraine by Nikita
Khrushchev in 1954.
[Editor's Note: The
transfer merited a paragraph in Pravda,
the official Soviet newspaper at the time, on Feb. 27, 1954. Here's what it
said:
"Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet transferring Crimea Province from the Russian Republic to the Ukraine
Republic, taking into account the integral character of the economy, the
territorial proximity and the close economic ties between Crimea Province and
the Ukraine Republic, and approving the joint presentation of the Presidium of
the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet and the Presidium of the Ukraine Republic
Supreme Soviet on the transfer of Crimea Province from the Russian Republic to
the Ukraine Republic."]
Here the West has something to offer Putin: international
recognition of Crimea's return to Russia. This way it could demand that this
process be a legal and orderly procedure based on a supervised referendum.
In return, Russia could finally recognize the
independence of Kosovo, whose succession followed the same principle of
self-determination of peoples and ethnic groups as Russia's Crimea policy.
Posted By
Worldmeets.US
The main objective of Western policy should be the stabilization
of a Western-oriented Ukraine. It is here that Russia has been the loser over recent
weeks - thanks to the triumph of (relatively) Western values in Maidan Square. When it comes to popular uprisings, there is
little realpolitikcan do.
Putin is well aware that he can no longer win over Ukraine
to his Eurasian Union.
All he can do is cause trouble. This is a typical stalemate that from the point
of realpolitik, can only be resolved through
negotiations. Consequently, the U.S. should now do everything possible to
persuade the leadership in Kiev to embrace de-escalation and open negotiations with
Russia in which the core interests of both sides can be taken into account.
On the one hand, that would ensure Ukraine's Western
orientation and a promise of non-interference from Moscow in Ukrainian
politics. On the other, Kiev would guarantee the rights of Russian-speaking
citizens and forgo entry into NATO - a red rag for Putin. This wouldn't represent
much of a cost to the West, since NATO is of no use against Russian power
politics.
