People burn the U.S. flag, calling for a ‘holy war’ against
America, after
Washington offered a $10
million for the capture of Hafiz Muhammed
Saeed, a leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group
responsible for the 2008
attacks on Mumbai, Apr. 6.
Pakistan and America:
Preparing for a Timely ‘Divorce’ (Le Monde, France)
"The reordering of
Pakistani diplomacy, which has decided to free itself from the American embrace
in order to seek new partners, will alter the regional landscape. The seeds for
a new geopolitical map of South Asia are being planted; one that is more
diverse and complex, and probably more unpredictable."
A little girl at a protest staged near the former hideout of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad holds a sign opposing drone attacks: Is there any hope of another U.S.-Pakistan reconciliation?
Don’t be afraid of the word “divorce.” The union between
Pakistan and the United States took place. The two countries, allies in the
“war against terror” throughout the post-9/11 decade, are rewriting their
agreements after “annushorribilis”
(2011), during which the spiral of strife seemed endless. The newly-emerging
relationship is not necessarily antagonistic. But it is no longer an alliance -
that special friendship that led the U.S. to marry their security interests. Indeed,
cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda was profound, with Pakistan forces arresting
dozens of the organization’s leaders who failed to seek sanctuary with the
Afghan Taliban.
The current repositioning is important, because Pakistan is
playing a key role in the Afghan theater - just as much in the dynamics of war
as in the scenario for future peace. And also because the reordering of
Pakistani diplomacy, which has decided to free itself from the American embrace
in order to seek new partners, will alter the regional landscape. The seeds for
a new geopolitical map of South Asia are being planted; one that is more
diverse and complex, and probably more unpredictable.
So - a horrible year. It started
badly and ended worse. On January 27, 2011, CIA agent Raymond Davis, on the
pretext of self- defense, shot two Pakistani civilians on the streets of
Lahore. The case was never adequately explained. But it created the first jolt
to the relationship between Washington and Islamabad. Nationalist and Islamist
circles in Pakistan found this it be ample material to denounce the growing
presence of the CIA on national soil - especially near the Pashtun
tribal areas in the northwest, where the Afghan insurgents have established
safe havens.
The dust from this first incident had yet to settle before a
new storm broke. In the inky night of May 1 and 2, a raid by U.S. Special
Forces liquidated Osama bin Laden in his hideout in Abbottabad,
a Pakistan garrison town north of the capital, Islamabad. The divergence of
reaction triggered by this event in each country served as a caricature of the strategic
misunderstanding on which their so-called alliance would stumble from then on;
the unspoken had become brutally clear.
The mere fact that bin Laden had been able to take refuge in
the shadow of Pakistani barracks confirmed America’s worst suspicions. Wasn’t
this evidence of the lack of credibility on the part of the Pakistan Army’s
secret services, already regularly blamed for the double game they play with
jihadist groups (Taliban or others) to serve the geopolitical interests of Islamabad
in regional theaters, (Indian Kashmir, Afghanistan)? In Pakistan, where a
collective denial of such duplicity has always prevailed, the Abbottabad raid was denounced as an unacceptable “violation
of national sovereignty.”
The crisis was then out in the open. On September 22, Mike
Mullen, the-then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, added salt to the
Pakistani wound by making a very serious allegation. He asserted that the “Haqqani Network” - an Afghan insurgent group operating in
Afghanistan from its safe haven in Pakistan’s North Waziristan - acted on some circumstances
acted as a “veritable arm” of Inter-Services Intelligence, (the ISI) – secret service of the Pakistani army. The “Haqqani Network” was carrying out attacks against American
interests in Afghanistan, meaning Admiral Mullen’s outburst implied that the ISI was in fact at war against the United States. And
indeed, it was a battle at Salala on November 26,
2011, on the increasingly volatile Afghan-Pakistani border, that pitted the two
armies against one another. On that day, fighting claimed the lives of 24
Pakistani soldiers. It was the final blow to the post-September 11 alliance. “For
us the reaction was, ‘Enough is enough.’” says Fazal-Ur-Rahman, a researcher at the Islamabad Institute of
Strategic Studies.
From the Davis affair to the incident at Salala,
victimization has given way to retaliation - and with disastrous consequences. Pakistan
expelled American military advisors on counterinsurgency, prohibited American
access to the Shamsi Air Base (Baloutchistan),
which was a launching pad for a good number of drones, and more importantly, it
blocked supply routes for NATO troops in Afghanistan that crossed Pakistani
soil. For its part, Washington suspended nearly $800 million of financial aid
to the Pakistani army. This sealed the split.
Now what? “The deterioration of the relationship is deep-rooted
and lasting,” emphasized a European diplomat. In Pakistan, it is time for
introspection regarding the reality of strategic convergence between the two
countries beyond tactical accommodations. Pakistanis are very bitter about the
way their country has always been used by Washington as part of its great
planetary game, but without any actual sensitivity to Islamabad’s interests,
particularly its angst against its rival, India.
Having faithfully served the United States during the Cold War,
Pakistan believes quite frankly, that its loyalty has not been reciprocated. In
Islamabad, they found it hard to put up with the American desire to handle
India with such consideration, despite its pro-Russian leaning at the time. In
the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War in
the heart of the Himalayas, won by Beijing, Washington then ostensibly drew
even closer to New Delhi and granted it military aid to stem Mao’s China. And
whenever war broke out between India and Pakistan (1965 and 1971), the
Americans refused to take sides, going as far as to suspend deliveries of
weapons to Islamabad. In the late
1970s, Pakistan’s nuclear program again poisoned relations and triggered U.S.
sanctions.
But this drift away from Pakistan was suspended twice after
major geopolitical events rehabilitated Pakistan in the eyes of the Americans,
promoting it to “a frontline state.” The first was the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in late 1979.
Forget concerns over a nuclear-armed Pakistan! American
President Ronald Reagan renewed military aid to Islamabad - and it became
massive - because the priority was to use Pakistani safe havens to bloody the Red
Army in Afghanistan. Ten years later, the departure of Russian troops from
Kabul signaled the end of the romance. Pakistan lost its strategic appeal to
Washington, which imposed new sanctions, justified by the sudden rediscovery of
its nuclear program. In Islamabad, the public was in shock.
The first ten year cycle was identical to that following the
terrorist attacks of September 11. This time, Pakistan became a “frontline
state” against al-Qaeda. George W. Bush wiped the slate clean over the nuclear
disagreement and asked his counterpart, General President Pervez
Musharraf of Pakistan, to make Pakistan available to
NATO in the interest of eradicating jihadist centers in Afghanistan and along
the Afghan-Pakistan border. Rewarded generously with aid, the Pakistanis
pretended to go along. In reality, they continued to covertly support the
Afghan Taliban insurgency, seen through their eyes as useful “fighters by proxy,”
battling the return of Indian influence in Afghanistan. The strategic
divergence with Washington became obvious: India - not Jihadism
- is the main enemy of the Pakistan Army, the repository of real power to
Islamabad. It is this fundamental contradiction, hidden under tactical
arrangements for so long, which has just come suddenly to light.
The heartbreak of annushorribilis 2011 should now come to an end. “The crisis has hit
bottom, it cannot go any lower” explains Abdullah Khan, director of the
Conflict Monitor Center. In Islamabad, the hour has come to overhaul the
bilateral relationship. “We must review the terms of engagement,” explains ImtiazGul, Executive Director of
the Center for Research and Security Studies. “They will no longer be dictated to
by the United States.” On April 12, following months of lengthy debate, the
Pakistan Parliament adopted a resolution establishing a framework for normalizing
diplomatic relations. The government has said it will use this as a starting
point, but so far has taken no action.
The parliamentary text opens the way for a lifting of the
blockade on NATO, decided in the aftermath of the cross-border incident at Salala (November 26). Parliament members have just one
condition: neither weapons nor ammunition should be included in NATO supplies
in transit to Afghanistan (which was already the case before the blockade). The
situation remains volatile as Islamist groups have already warned that they
would physically oppose any re-opening of the supply route, irrespective of the
nature of the goods conveyed. Another parliamentary demand is that the U.S. ceases
drone attacks on safe havens in the tribal areas. This is a more delicate
question, the Americans having no intention of abandoning the policy. This
particular arm-wrestling match is destined to continue.
But how long can Pakistan stand up to Washington in this
way? How much room to maneuver does it really have? While its economy is a
disaster, can it afford the luxury of shunning American assistance - civilian
and military - valued by Washington on average at $2 billion per year in the
decade between 2001 and 2011?In fact,
Pakistanis reject these figures, arguing that much of the funding has never been
disbursed. “American aid to Pakistan is a myth,” stressed Fazul-ur-Rahman.
Be that as it may, the Americans weigh heavily on the
Pakistani economy, not least through their links with the International
Monetary Fund, from which Islamabad is desperately seeking loans. So it is
therefore imperative for Pakistan to talk itself up when courting new partners.
The Europeans - particularly the French with their friendly Gaullist tradition -
have suddenly become interesting [to Islamabad]. Less politically correct, Iran
(for its gas) is also much solicited by Islamabad. “Today Iran is a real
temptation for Pakistan,” summarized one European diplomat. The relationship
between the two states was once very tense, as militant Shiism
exported from Tehran after the 1979 Khomeini revolution met with a violent
reaction by Sunni extremists in Pakistan. But mistrust has dissipated over
recent years.
Posted by Worldmeets.US
Less controversially, China is emphatically presented in
Islamabad as a valuable alternative that could soften the blow of the crisis
with the United States. Finally, and this takes the cake, the Indian “enemy” is
now viewed with less hostility. Never, until recent weeks, has there been a
question of lifting trade restrictions between the two neighbors – up until now
straight jacketed for strategic reasons. But the paradox is only superficial. “Pakistan
cannot fight on two fronts at once,” decodes the European diplomat. If the
western border with Afghanistan is ablaze, the eastern border with India must
be calm. No question about it, the end of Pakistan’s U.S. alliance is
reshuffling the cards. Little by little, a new regional order is taking
shape.
