If NATO Can't Beat Taliban, it Should Buy Afghan Poppy
"Followers of the Taliban must
be wooed with dedication in every region. Rather than setting poppy fields on
fire, ISAF should buy the poppy crop at market prices and then destroy it,
cutting the Taliban off from the heroin trade. The motto should be: if you
can't beat the enemy, buy him."
The withdrawal of Dutch troops
from Afghanistan's southern province of Uruzgan is being compensated militarily
by reinforcements, particularly from the United States. But this is a grave
political signal. With full knowledge that next year, 2,800 Canadian soldiers
will follow, the Taliban are celebrating the departure of the last 150 members of
the original 1,950-strong Dutch unit. With troop withdrawals starting amid the
rising power of the insurgency, a kind of apocalyptic mood has begun to spread.
Likewise, in other countries support is dwindling for the war, which will soon
surpass the duration of the First and Second World Wars combined.
Posted by WORLDMEETS.US
The same applies to the
United States, even if Barack Obama (unlike a majority of his own party) has
assured us that this is a "necessary war" being pursued to eliminate a
safe haven for terrorism. And yet the president benefits from relatively low
voter interest in the issue. But how long can this go on? And when will the
second and third largest suppliers of troops, Great Britain and Germany, follow
the Netherlands? A premature withdrawal by the nations of ISAF (the International
Security Assistance Force) would not just lead to further newspaper interviews with
Taliban and celebratory bonfires in the Hindu Kush, but the opposite of a more
peaceful state of global affairs would result. International terrorism isn't on
the march because Western troops are stationed in Afghanistan; rather, Western
troops are stationed in Afghanistan because on September 11, 2001, violent
terrorists attacked the United States.
Nevertheless, the West must
admit that its strategies have failed. Neither the originally “robust” military
action taken by the United States, nor the networked approach of the Bundeswehr provided the
necessary breakthrough. The basic problem: far too often, the focus has been on
strengthening Kabul. The goal of a new strategy must be to create, supply and
finance real centers of influence in the provinces. Followers of the Taliban must
be wooed with dedication in every region. Rather than setting poppy fields on
fire, ISAF should buy the poppy crop at market prices and then destroy it, cutting
the Taliban off from the heroin trade. The motto should be: if you can’t beat
the enemy, buy him.
