Missile Shield
Talks: How the Bush Team Lost Poland
"The Americans
don't understand how much everything has changed since the 1990s. Even
Americans who were against the war don't understand to what extent Iraq has
weakened both the image and the actual influence of the United States. Even
U.S. experts on our region fail to fully appreciate the fact that after Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, not only the French and the Germans,
but also the Poles, stopped automatically associating every American action in
the world with democracy and human rights."
Polish Foreign Minister
Radek Sikorski: He and Prime Minister Tusk are playing high-stakes poker,
demanding cash for military modernization and Patriot missile batteries
for Warsaw. He and Tusk say they aren't
satisfied that Washington has shown enough concern for Poland's security.
Anti-missile shield negotiations
are a symbol of the decline of American power and attractiveness under the
administration of George W. Bush. But they are also a painful lesson about how
we should not conduct our diplomacy.
During the next few days, talks
about the rules under which Poland is to host elements of the American missile
shield will probably crumble. Even if that doesn't happen, they will at best
bring about a forced compromise, which won't succeed in drying the ocean of bad
blood that has been spilled between Washington and Warsaw. How has it come to
this?
Let’s go back to the very
beginning of the talks. It's the morning of December 7, 2005. Donald Rumsfeld,
the powerful U.S. Defense Secretary, is receiving the KazimierzMarcinkiewicz’s cabinet's freshly sworn-in Polish
Defense Minister, RadekSikorski.
The sun is shining; both politicians are smiling to the photographers. Sikorski - in his blue tie and brand-name shirt with
Windsor collar - is sporting a wide smile. Rumsfeld’s
smile is forced, he is visibly tired; things in Iraq are going from bad to
worse [photo below].
December
7, 2005: Missile shield talks with Poland begin at the
Pentagon.On the left, Polish Defense
Minister RadekSikorski.
On
the right, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. After the
talks,
Sikorski left behind a list of demands on Rumsfeld's desk. Reports
from witnesses say Rumsfeld
was offended.
After a while they go into the
Defense Secretary’s office and … Sikorski puts on Rumsfeld’s desk a list of Polish demands in exchange for
possible hosting of an American anti-missile shield, including for the first
time, the mention of Patriot missiles.
According to consistent
eye-witness accounts, Rumsfeld, one of the most arrogant people in Washington,
was terribly offended. And he was not alone. Soon later I spoke in Warsaw with
an American diplomat who privately detested Rumsfeld. “You cannot do that! This
isn't a way to treat America! Especially if you want to be our close ally!
After all, it was we who put you in NATO!” the agitated American said.
The Americans don't understand how
much everything has changed since the 1990s. Even Americans who were against
the war don't understand to what extent Iraq has weakened both the image and
the actual influence of the United States. Even U.S. experts on our region fail
to fully appreciate the fact that after Abu Ghraib
and Guantanamo, not only the French and the Germans, but also the Poles stopped
automatically associating every American action in the world with democracy and
human rights.
Moreover - and from the American
point of view, this should be even more important - Polish politicians have to
take public opinion into account. Yes, supporting the U.S. in Iraq has (temporarily)
advanced Warsaw into the first league of European politics. But during
2005-2006, what Poles saw in Iraq was not advancement, but chaos, as our
businesses fled the country and the attacks killed our soldiers. Poles began to
seriously wonder whether French President Jacques Chirac - although arrogant -
was right when he advised the Poles to “sit down and shut up” on the matter of
Iraq.
Washington didn't understand this.
Many diplomats and advisers were convinced that Poland would agree to the shield
in exchange for Bush’s handshake and a few mentions about a close alliance with
Poland in his speeches. What's more, a few months ago I myself still heard
here, from a number of quite important and not-at-all stupid persons that the
shield is, basically, a way of rewarding Poland for Iraq. Since it's
strategically beneficial to Warsaw to host an American base, Poles should not
only accept it, but be openly thankful.
However, such expectations were
completely unrealistic given the mood on the ground in Warsaw. The Polish
people, after a period of glorifying the Reagan’s America in the 80s and
Clinton’s America in the 90s, were deeply disillusioned with the U.S. Apart
from Iraq, there was the question of the visas, that thorn in the side of
Polish-American relations and a clear example of strategic shortsightedness of
Washington’s elites (more Congress even than consecutive presidents are to
blame here). And, finally, the question of the probable secret CIA prison in Mazury region.
In 2005, Warsaw was no longer
prepared to blindly support America’s ideas. Not just Sikorski,
but any Polish politician would have had to put that list of Polish demands on Rumsfeld’s desk.
WHY OVERPAY?
During the last few months, the
notion that America is entitled to install the missile shield in Poland has
partly dissipated from Washington’s position. More often than I did two years
ago, I meet diplomats, advisers and politicians telling me: “It's a mistake not
to give Poland sizable aid. At relatively small cost - a billion or two
[dollars] - we could not only have a strategic missile site in place, but we
could also cement an important alliance. These negotiations are a catastrophe.”
But such voices remain in the
minority. Polish stubbornness in the negotiations leads more often to reaction
of impatience than reflection.
Last autumn, the Bush team
underestimated the revolutionary transformation of the shield talks brought
about when [Prime Minister] Tusk's cabinet took over from Prime Minister JarosławKaczyński [his
brother, Lech Kaczyński, remains President].
At that time, I heard from a
high-ranking American diplomat: “RadekSikorski is the Foreign Minister, we know him; somehow
we’ll manage to reach an agreement.”
Because of this attitude of
complacency, the Bush team lost several key months. Real negotiations with Sikorski and Tusk did not begin until February. Had the
White House made up its mind last fall that Poland should be given at least a
few hundred million dollars in [military] assistance, perhaps a deal could have
been achieved. This spring, when, after talking to Tusk, Bush reportedly began
considering such a scenario, it was already too late. A Democratic Congress
wouldn't provide this kind of money to a President on his way out, especially a
President as lonely and unpopular as Bush. Bush is now a lame duck, and a much
lamer duck than his predecessors have been.
But to understand Washington’s
mistakes in these negotiations, one more element is needed. The U.S. government
in its talks with Poland, like on many other issues, is not monolithic. From
the beginning there was some "anti-Polish" sentiment in the Pentagon.
Our diplomats almost jumped with joy when in March during talks with Tusk, Bush
declared that the Condoleezza Rice and the State Department would take over
coordination of the negotiations. “Bush has shown the door to the Pentagon
jingoists,” a high-ranking Polish diplomat told me.
But then again, the arguments of
the Pentagon and some of Rice’s minions - that the shield could be installed in
Poland almost for free - prevailed. And if you can get it cheaply, why pay
more?
Internal fighting, and sometimes
simply a lack of coordination, was visible not only during talks with Warsaw,
but also with Prague. The Czech government is amenable to the idea of the
shield, but its decision to host American ground radar on Czech territory has
little chance of being ratified by the Czech Parliament. Several months ago,
some U.S. diplomats were energetically trying to persuade the leaders of tiny
Czech parties to support the shield. At the same time, another branch of the
State Department published a report about world corruption that chastised these
same leaders.
FOURTH OF JULY 'GIFT' FROM TUSK
But the megalomania and myopia of
the Americans is just one side of the coin. The other is the manner in which
Poland conducted these negotiations. Our strategy has never been consistent.
Half a year after RadekSikorski
put the list of Polish postulates on Rumsfeld’s desk,
a new Prime Minister, JarosławKaczyński, came to Washington. Sikorski
accompanied him. But the difference in the way the two politicians spoke about
the shield - officially and unofficially - was striking.
RUSSIAN REPORT
ON POLAND'S REJECTION OF U.S. SHIELD OFFER
Sikorski, roughly speaking, was of the opinion that the shield
proposal is advantageous for Poland, provided that the Americans add something
to their offer - for example, Patriot missiles. Both Kaczyński
brothers [the former Prime Minister and the-then and current President] saw the
situation in a different light: if we can get something from Americans, fine,
but if not, we should take the deal anyway, since it ties Poland more tightly
to the U.S., which is in itself of inestimable value.
Last autumn, a third approach
emerged: that of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who is much more cutting than Sikorski. Tusk, who was intent on re-orienting Polish
foreign policy toward Europe and was well-aware of the skepticism of Poles in
regard to the shield, didn't care much for the project - unless the Americans
gave us something very big - or rather, something Tusk could sell the voters as
a major success.
Lamentably, from the moment that
the PO [Citizen’s Platform party] took over, the shield became the object of a
sharp political battle between Tusk and the Kaczyński
brothers. Tusk strove to present the Kaczyńskis
as America’s poodles, ready to give Bush everything he wanted without asking
for anything in return.
In fact, Tusk’s
warlike posture sometimes bordered on the comical. Before his March visit with Bush, the Prime Minister was
hollering in regard to the visa issue, “We won’t be asking any more. This is
over!” And yet, after their meeting, Bush said that he “shares Prime Minister’s
Tusk impatience” over the prolonged difficulties over the visas. We, the
reporters who were on the scene at the Oval Office, saw Tusk literally blanch
after these words [Watch below].
Prime Minister Tusk of Poland with President Bush in the
Oval Office.
President
Bush thanked Tusk for his 'candor', March 10, 00:16:55. WATCH .
A half hour later, the Prime
Minister began his own press conference for Polish journalists with two
statements. First, that it was Bush, not he, who started talking about visas. Second, that “our predecessors have left the negotiations
over the shield in a state that makes it hard to fight for Polish interests.”
So right after the most important meeting yet about the shield, the Prime
Minister was making a political speech directed at the TV audience in Warsaw
and small-town Poland.
In democracies, foreign policy is
always joined at the hip with domestic politics. But both Tusk and Kaczyński, when dealing with the shield, have crossed
the line beyond which domestic squabbling harms foreign policy.
Kaczyński, in turn, painted Tusk as an adventurer. Sometimes it was
clear that he was keeping his fingers crossed that Tusk and Sikorski
wouldn't succeed in managing to negotiate for more than he and his brother were
ready to accept.
Americans, despite their lack of
diplomatic coordination, were perfectly aware of those differences of opinion
in Warsaw. Both President Kaczyński’s
unfortunate declaration a year ago - that the issue of the shield “is practically
decided,” - and the latest desperate expedition of Mrs. Fotyga
[the President’s chief of staff] to Washington - diminished the chances that
Poland would achieve very much in the negotiations.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk: The Polish opposition accuses him
of making a back-door deal with Russia, after he declared the latest U.S.
proposal for missile shield 'unsatisfactory.'
At the same time, Tusk’s
declarations of “not ceding a point” gradually became less and less productive.
They irritated even those in Washington who were inclined to see our point of
view. The worst came when Tusk declared he would not accept American
conditions. He did this on July 4, the American national holiday. I doubt that
Tusk’s people, consumed by their fight with the Kaczyńskis,
even noticed. But in Washington it is now offered as crowning proof that Poland
isn't serious, and that Tusk is more concerned with slapping America around
than with negotiating.
DECLARE YOURSELF, POLAND!
Tusk’s government missed one more
thing - time isn't on their side. When in April, the NATO summit not only gave
its blessing to the shield, but acknowledged that it would be part of the
Alliance’s defense system, it was good news for
Poland, since we ceased to go against the grain in Europe. But at the same
time, it was bad news - Americans had became more
confident and less prone to listen to our demands.
America, though still weakened, is
stronger than it was two years ago. Iraq is calmer. Europe is governed by the
most pro-American (which doesn’t mean pro-Bush) quartet in decades - Merkel,
Brown, Sarkozy and Berlusconi. The diplomats of the
major European countries are preparing for joint action with the U.S. on
Palestine, Iran and Russia. And although these plans will probably come to
fruition under Bush’s successor, it's clear that Europe is again opening to the
United States.
Despite all the criticisms of the Kaczyński brothers, I think that fundamentally, they
are right. The shield is, all things considered, beneficial to Poland, since
the main strategic ally of Warsaw must be Washington. There is no alternative.
Among Tusk’s advisers there are
people (like Roman Kuźniar) who forcefully argue
that the alternative is the European Union. This is a dangerous illusion. The
whole of Europe has spent the last decade trying to start down the road to
strategic independence. It hasn't succeeded. In the short term it has no chance
of becoming either (fortunately) a counterweight to the U.S., as Jacques Chirac
and Gerhard Schröder dreamed of, or (unfortunately) a
serious, independent partner for America - the second pillar of Western
civilization, according to the cherished plans of Tony Blair or Joschka Fischer.
We Poles should nevertheless
strive toward the creation of strategically and militarily independent Europe.
But at this point in time, we have to accept the fact that it doesn't yet
exist.
The opportunities opened up by the
weakness of America under Bush - temporary, in my opinion - were milked not by
Europe, but by much less appealing powers: first of all China, and, to a lesser
degree, Russia and Iran.
With the departure of Bush, the
rising ambitions of Beijing, Moscow and Tehran will increasingly come into
sharper focus. And with Europe's need to solve the dilemma that it poses to
itself, a new game is taking shape on the global chessboard. This is a
dangerous for Poland, since only the blind don't see the neo-imperialist
tendencies of Russia.
Due to its strategic location,
Poland cannot without a good reason suddenly ignore America, as Spanish Prime
Minister Zapatero has done [after the terrorist
attacks in Madrid]. Poland has to declare itself in the new global game.
Accepting the shield will help us in this task - not hurt us.
WITH OBAMA OR WITH MCCAIN
So what’s next for the shield? The
two worst-case scenarios for Poland are, fortunately, the least probable.
Relocating the missile base to Lithuania would be technically difficult. In addition,
Bush is unlikely to reach an agreement with anyone else in Europe, and the
likelihood that Barack Obama will discard the entire project is extremely
unlikely. There's a growing consensus in Washington that because of Iran, the
shield in Europe is a necessity.
BARACK OBAMA ON
IRAQ AND AMERICAN SECURITY, JULY 15
Even
if things look bleak now, it's not improbable that in the coming weeks Poland
will, after all, come to an agreement with the United States. It will accept
the shield on two conditions: that there be a battery of Patriot missiles from
Germany stationed permanently or semi-permanently on Polish territory; and that
the U.S. issue a declaration guaranteeing Polish national security, reinforcing
NATO treaty obligations.
Although I don’t see how Tusk can
sell this to Poles as a great success and a significant change compared to what
Kaczyński could have achieved a year ago, it
won’t be a tragedy for Poland either.
There remains another solution.
“We're going to demand a lot from Bush, since it makes no sense to make gifts
to someone who is leaving soon,” a high-ranking Polish diplomat told me half a
year ago. “If we are to give presents, we’ll give them to his successor.”
JOHN MCCAIN ON
IRAQ AND AMERICAN SECURITY, JUNE 5
This
is now the most likely option: Tusk and Sikorski will
not come to an agreement with Bush, but will do it with Obama or McCain, more
or less along the lines described above.
This won’t be bad for Poland. But
we must learn from this bitter lesson: Without a unified, strategically
consistent and wisely pursued vision of negotiations, one achieves little when
talking to a serious partner.
It's little consolation that in
this instant, the Americans are losers, too.
