America is Neither
Friend Nor Foe (Gazeta,
Russia)
“Although Obama hasn’t
change America’s course, he understands better than most U.S. politicians how the
world has changed and how much more flexibility and sensitivity is now required
of America if it want to maintain its leadership position. … When it comes to
complex, multilayered relations between countries that were recently mortal enemies,
one cannot expect cloudless skies.”
Sociological service, the Pew Research Center, has published
the results of a new
global survey of public attitudes on American politics. Among the most
notable results is a marked decline in approval for Barack Obama's foreign
policy. Compared with 2009, the number of those who approve of his foreign
policy in China has dropped 30 percent, Japan and Muslim countries by 19 percent
and in Europe by 15 percent. In Russia, the decline was 18 percent.
In general, the causes of this decline are clear. It would
have been impossible for anyone to live up to the level of expectation associated
with Barack Obama's election victory. Especially as the first Black president
of the United States was so generous with his promises, pledging to forge a new
strategy for American leadership. As it turned out, little of this was achieved,
as Obama had to spend most of his time responding to chaotic change in
different parts of the world rather than working toward achieving his stated
goals.
Russia’s drop of confidence in Obama is more surprising than
in other countries, because Russians were less affected by Obama-mania in 2008
than was the rest of humanity.
More than anywhere else, the prevalent conviction among
Russians has been that the name and personality of the president matter little:
the U.S. maintains an attitude (hostile to Russia, naturally) which does not
change. That sentiment should have prevented any disappointment, particularly
in light of the catastrophic legacy left by Bush. Any successor of his was
doomed to attempt to remedy the situation, because in the fall of 2008, the circumstances
that had evolved were the most dire since the early Reagan years.
But there is another factor at play. Most Russians simply didn’t
believe that Americans would elect a non-White president. The notion of an
inescapable American racism had been absorbed by our society, not so much through
Soviet propaganda as through Uncle Tom's Cabin,
which was required reading for many generations of children. And when, to
everyone's surprise, it was found that the race factor didn’t play a decisive
role after all, it was tempting to believe that this very unusual president
would implement very different policies. But that doesn't happen in established
political systems, and in the absence of revolution, many were disappointed.
Looking at things realistically and not expecting the
impossible, Russia has no reason to feel disappointed in Obama. He remains the
most comfortable conversation partner for Moscow - and not just because of the
"reset" (accomplished successfully, as this is an agenda that was
achieved a year and a half ago).
Although Obama hasn’t change America’s course, he
understands better than most U.S. politicians how the world has changed and how
much more flexibility and sensitivity (qualities not common in Washington) are now
required of the United States if it wants to maintain its leadership role.
Pressure and attempts to consolidate dominance are increasingly producing the
opposite. His opponents regard Obama's attempts to rely more on agreements and
cooperation as a sign of weakness, a betrayal of American interests and a blow
to American prestige.
U.S.-Russia relations today are clearly strained, and it
seems that the results of the reset have all but evaporated. There have been a
series of jabs in just the last few days. The "exchange of
pleasantries" between Hillary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov
on Syria is a case in point: the secretary of state declared that that she had
information on the impending delivery of Russian combat helicopters to the
Assad regime, while the foreign minister accused the U.S. of supplying arms to
the rebels. A group of senators demanded that the Pentagon sever commercial
ties with Rosoboronexport and not purchase helicopters and other
equipment from the company for the Afghan military and police, a deal that had
been agreed to over two years ago. The reason: the Russian company is allegedly
aiding Iran in its missile program. The Congress is expected to pass new
legislation on trade with Russia: the legendary Jackson-Vanik amendment is no more, giving way to a new instrument
allowing the imposition of sanctions against those implicated in the Magnitsky
case and similar crimes. Add to that, the criticism of Russia for its laws
on public rallies and raids on the opposition, the stalemate on missile
defense, the demonstrative absence of Vladimir Putin from the Camp David Summit
in response to Obama's refusal to come to Vladivostok this fall, and what has become the familiar escapades of U.S. Ambassador Michael
McFaul. All of this paints a grim picture. Are things really that bad? The sky
may not be sunny, but it is too early to declare the relationship dead.
Posted
by Worldmeets.US
First, let us not forget that America is in the midst of an
election campaign. Russia, of course, is not at its epicenter, but even being
on the sidelines is enough. We survived a similar [campaign]
period in Russia six months ago, which was rife with unpleasant rhetoric toward
the U.S.
Second, it is important to distinguish hard line negotiation
from elements of a propaganda war that are meant to lead one’s opponent toward
compromise. So disagreements over Syria and Iran are of fundamental importance right
now, since in both cases, the chips are on the table.
In Syria, Annan's plan is on the verge of total collapse,
and what will follow is a fork in the road: either all parties will cooperate to
ensure regime change with foreign participation and oversight, or there will be
an increase in the pumping up of the Syrian opposition with money and weapons
to improve its chances of winning the civil war. In both scenarios, accusations
against Russia are always handy. Remind everyone that Moscow's interest in
Syria is money – and nothing else. At the same time, throw in arguments in
favor of equipping the opposition: if Russia is arming Damascus, the free world
must ensure balance.
In the Iranian plot, what could be the deciding round of negotiations
in Moscow on the future Tehran’s nuclear program is looming. The previous
meeting in Baghdad was next to fruitless, but moderates have high hopes for the
next round. Again, a psychological attack to raise the stakes does no harm. Of
course in both cases, the context of negotiations is far from amicable,
although neither is it extraordinarily hostile. This is nothing personal. It is
just the normal game of diplomacy played by great unallied powers exerting themselves
to achieve a desired result.
Third, one shouldn't ignore the way some members of the U.S.
executive branch, operating under less than favorable conditions, are trying to
reduce the impact of political impulses. The State Department and White House,
while siding with the pathos of Republican supporters of the “Magnitsky List,” have tried hard to limit its negative effects. As a preventative
measure, the State Department drew up its own list (not made public and rumored
to be short) in an effort to prevent the Magnitsky
tragedy from being used by Congress as a pretext for adding anyone it sees fit to
the "banned" list. The trick of bundling the list with the repeal of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment not only eliminates an absurd
act from 1974, but it introduces visa restrictions based on an isolated case
into a relatively routine legislative framework. In any case, Russia's reaction
will be quite negative, but of all the ways the list could be implemented, this
is the least traumatic.
Finally, the
Pentagon, to which appeals are being made in regard to Syria and Iran, is in no
hurry to meet demands to punish Russia, and has officially distanced itself
from the charges Clinton alleged. It is more important for the Defense Department
to maintain stable relations with Russia on Afghanistan (for equipment, cargo,
transit routes, etc.) than to become mired in political gamesmanship.
When it comes
to complex, multilayered relations between countries that were recently mortal enemies,
one cannot expect cloudless skies. The question is whether there is a conscious
inclination toward conflict, or if tensions are simply a consequence of
objective and structural factors. There is no atmosphere of inevitable conflict
in Russian-American relations today, at least in the upper echelons of power. This
doesn't guarantee that new crises won’t arise, but at least it offers hope that
they will be resolved.
*Fyodor
Lukyanov is Chief Editor for Russia in Global Affairs
