The People's Republic of China Isn't What the West Thinks …
"Other
powers that are wary of China- whether they are Western countries or Russia -
subconsciously ascribe their own logic of behavior to China, meaning the way
they would behave if in China's place."
Chinese President Hu Jintao addresses the U.N. General Assembly in September: Is his country a predator or just looking after its own? Debate in the West rages.
Twenty years ago, on October
1, 1989, the People’s Republic of China celebrated its 40th birthday.
Student protests in Tiananmen Square and their brutal suppression five months earlier
made a heavy impression on the Chinese elite. In addition, these events led to a deterioration
of relations between Beijing and Western countries, which were already the
largest investors in the Chinese economy.
And although the benefits of partnership
wouldn't allow the United States and Western Europe to completely isolate the
PRC, an atmosphere of great tension emerged and an embargo on the sale of
weapons to China was imposed, which to this day remains in effect.
A week later, on October 7,
that very same anniversary was marked by another socialist country - the German
Democratic Republic [East
Germany]. Shortly before that, East German leader Erich Honecker promised
that the Berlin Wall would stand another 150 years - or as long as necessary.
Attending the celebrations was also the initiator of perestroika [political and
economic reform], Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev, who is said to have told Honecker: “He who is late, is punished
by life,” - referring to perestroika.
Aside from Moscow, Beijing
and East Berlin were the two major capitols of the communist world. China,
beginning in 1960s, embodied an alternative within the socialist
community to the Soviet model. And East Germany not only served as the frontline of the Cold
War's geopolitical confrontation, it also demonstrated the most successful
socialism of all: after all, whatever the Germans do, they do it better than
anyone else.
Ten days later, Honecker was
removed from his post as General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of
Germany, and was replaced by Egon Krenz. A month later the Berlin Wall came down.
Following the statement by party official Günter Schabowski
on his decision to ease traveling restrictions, border guards suddenly opened
up the checkpoint in Berlin. Four days later, the last communist government of East
Germany was formed, headed by Hans
Modrow.
In an ironic twist of fate, these
three men - Krenz, Schabowski and Modrow - all traveled to Beijing that June to
express support for the Beijing government’s suppression of its “anti-socialist
uprising.” However that autumn, when similar events broke out in their own
country, no one dared use force.
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Gorbachev’s warning had come
true: it was too late to save East Germany, and a year later the country disappeared
from the maps of Europe. Thirteen months after that, the USSR was no more. Meanwhile
today, the People' Republic of China is celebrating another birthday, its 60th.
Over the past 20 years, the perceptions
of China have changed more than its political system. If before it had all the features
of a repressive communist dictatorship resisting political modernization, now
the same analysts diligently look for signs of maturation - and even the materialization
of liberal change. This is true, even though the examples cited as showing a growth in
civic activity and its impact on the party is more reminiscent of a Soviet feedback
mechanism than a democratic model. Well-meaning Western researchers want to
see a positive trend. However, it's important to state that there is evidence that China is,
albeit slowly, moving toward something resembling the Western model.
After the start of economic reforms
in the winter of 1978, Beijing showed practically no foreign policy ambitions.
The fruitless 1979 war with Vietnam - which had the goal of forcing Hanoi to withdraw
from Cambodia and thus limit its claims to regional domination, only served to convince
the Chinese Communist Party of the need to increase its influence through other
means. The current balance of power and influence of the two neighboring
countries - China and Vietnam - require no comment.
China didn't lose the Cold
War, and after establishing relations with the United States in early 1970s,
Beijing effectively sided with the Cold War's ultimate winners. The Chinese had
no reason for an inferiority complex. Unlike Russia, which has lost ground
territorially and ideologically, China conceded neither geopolitically nor
ideologically. Moreover, Beijing has accomplished a great deal in the past 20
years. Aside from reacquiring its once contested territories of Hong Kong and
Macau - as a result of a settling of diplomatic conflicts with Kyrgyzstan and
Russia - it again obtained the notorious island of Damansky,
which once upon a time had been defended in bloody
battles by Soviet border troops. By mutual agreement, Damansky has now been transferred to China.
Further consolidation of
territories that Beijing considers to be its own, first and foremost Taiwan, is
on the agenda. Few doubt that over the course of the next 20 to 25 years, this,
too, will happen peacefully.
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In international politics,
China is concerned about one thing - to increase its influence without overly intimidating
its partners. Beijing has been only partly successful, regardless of how
Chinese officials harp on the fact that their only priority is to achieve
a harmonious international arena. But if one looks without bias at Chinese policies,
it's hard to detect any expansionist inclinations in the traditional sense.
Sometimes it seems that other powers that are wary of China- whether they are
Western countries or Russia - subconsciously ascribe their own logic of
behavior to China, meaning the way they would behave if in China's place.
In practice, the China's
foreign policy embodies what Russia merely declares: promoting domestic
development as the goal of global action. The Chinese approach is based on two interrelated
goals - securing access to sources of raw materials and markets for their manufactured
goods - without the side effects of messianism or overcoming its own complexes
at the expense of others.
But in pursuing its objectives,
Beijing is persistent, consistent and not inclined to concessions or deals. And
this frightens its partners, who see haughtiness and duplicity in such
straightforwardness. Meanwhile, China’s 20-year transformation into one of the
leading world powers is proof of the benefits of its egoism - meaning an inward
focus and an absence of secondary motivations and ambitions.
When Washington realized that
containing China would be nearly impossible, it began to talk about integrating
it into the global system as a “responsible stakeholder.” In other words - to
expand the rights accorded Beijing, but also to invest it with responsibilities.
However, this isn't part of China’s plans. It doesn't aspire to domination and hardly
even insists on expanding its influence. But what it doesn't accept are limitations
imposed from without, since China is confident that what it claims belongs to
it by right - and that this is what the limits of its own ambitions should be.
However, China will not be
able to avoid confrontation if current growth trends continue. Because at some
point the behavior of other participants in the international arena will be
determined not by Beijing’s true intensions, however noble they may be, but by
a desire to counterbalance China's enormous potential by all means possible. It is
entirely possible that the next such anniversary of the People’s Republic will
take place in a completely different situation.
*Fyodor Lukyanov is Chief
Editor for the magazine Russian in Global Affairs
