Debunking the Tall Tales of the Great War, Now that it's 'Over'!
"The
Daily Telegraph summed up an enduring myth: that war reparations imposed
on Germany constituted an 'intolerable' burden, the economic consequences of
which 'determined' Hitler's rise and the outbreak of war. This myth has contributed
to the enthronement of John Maynard Keynes and promoted the ideological fantasy
that depicts him as uniquely anticipating the disastrous consequences of a
peace that called for reparations that were 'humiliating' and 'impossible' to
pay."
With Germany's final payment
of war reparations last week, newspapers reported the "end" of World War I. Referring to the
issue, the Daily
Telegraph clearly summed up an
enduring myth: that war reparations imposed on Germany constituted an
“intolerable” burden, the economic consequences of which “determined” Hitler's
rise and the outbreak of the Second World War [Daily Telegraph video below]. This myth has contributed to the enthronement of John Maynard Keynes as an intellectual
and promoted the ideological fantasy that depicts him as uniquely anticipating
the disastrous consequences of a peace that called for reparations that were "humiliating"
and “impossible” to pay.
[Editor's Note: Few people realize that the French, as a result of the Franco-Prussian war in the 1870s, were forced to pay reparations equivalent to five billion francs to Germany, as the price of getting the Germans to withdraw from French territory, and losing the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine in the process. Read about it in this passage from the book A Shattered Peace by journalist and author David Andelman.]
The more acceptable approach to
historical truth suggests a very different Germany after the Armistice; in
particular in regard to the relationship between the macroeconomic policies
pursued after the war and the reparations that Germany was forced to pay. The
amount of reparations didn't give rise to an unsustainable debt, nor were
reparations the principal cause of German hyper-inflation. In 1921, as a
percentage of GDP, German debt was less than Britain's. And the reparations never
exceeded 8.3 percent of German national income - far removed from the forecasts
of 50 percent put forward by the “clairvoyant” Keynes. By the way, German
macroeconomic imbalances were caused by the strategy advocated by Keynes: devalue
the currency to increase exports and generate income to pay off foreign debt; increase
public spending by boosting inflation and reducing the real value of domestic
government debt.
But as Germany’s trading
partners passed through a period of deflation, fluctuations in relative prices canceled
out the effects of its nominal devaluations on German competitiveness and
hyper-inflation destroyed the currency. Hitler was quick to assure Germans that
the Nazi Party would end
the “larceny of inflation.” It was the disastrous policies recommended by
Keynes - and not the reparations - the real value of which turned out to be ludicrous
- which were responsible for the serious economic crisis of the post-war era, when
the demagoguery of National Socialism flourished.
As for “humiliation,” the
negative reaction of the German people began even before the Armistice was
signed. Acceptance of its terms by the German Social Democratic government on
November 11, 1918, immediately boosted the political fortunes of those who
called those who favored ending the war “the Criminals of November.” Not having
suffered an invasion or a significant loss of territory, the Germans quickly
convinced themselves that they hadn't lost the war, therefore any treaty that depicted
them as being defeated would always be “humiliating.” The pall of illegitimacy
and of weakness cast over the Weimar Republic after the
new Constitution was approved in 1919 cannot be separated from this widespread
sense of humiliation. German resentment sustained another long-standing myth that
is blatantly inconsistent with the information available: the myth of the
deliberate attempt by the Allies to exterminate Germans through starvation. In fact,
it was the German authorities who refused the offer of food aid. In March 1919,
Allied ships began unilaterally transporting food aid.
Another persistent myth
depicts American President
Woodrow Wilson as a stubborn “destroyer of empires.” It is indisputable
that Wilson believed in potentially dangerous ideological vacuities such as
“making the world safe for democracy” - a slogan, the destabilizing potential
of which is well-illustrated by the neo-conservatives, who are Wilson’s
intellectual progeny. What's doubtful is that Wilson’s convictions were at all decisive
in regard to the geopolitical reordering of Europe. Four circumstances
contributed to the breakdown of defeated empires into nation states.
Posted
by WORLDMEETS.US
Wilson: Hero to some, misguided
dreamer to others.
The first was the chaos that
followed the Armistice: American politicians responsible for the peace
negotiations gradually discovered a series of treaties, secret agreements and
concessions that the Allies signed off on since the start of the war and which
substantially constrained the talks. The second was the nationalist dissent that
had been nurtured for more than a century: the multi-ethnic empires were far
from being paragons of harmony imagined by some nostalgic souls. The Habsburg Empire, for
example, simply disintegrated. And ironically, its dissolution could have been prevented
through recourse to military force - precisely the kind of constructive policy
that Wilson’s critics rejected. Even if there had been the clear desire to
preserve the Habsburg Empire - and manifestly there wasn’t - the main grievance
on the part of Hungary wasn't the destruction of the Empire, but the fact that
three million Hungarians were excluded from the borders of the new nation
state.
American propaganda poster calling for unity during World War I.
The third circumstance was
the strategic interest of France, which wanted to create a balance of power
capable of countering German military power through the creation of nation
states, particularly with the reformation of Poland. But the fourth and more
important consideration in Europe's geopolitical reordering, which was also in
line with French wishes, was the desire to create a cordon sanitaire
of new states that might contain the “virus” of Bolshevism and hinder the
western spread of communist barbarism. The major preoccupation of the Allies was
to prevent the “global revolution” announced by Trotsky. Wilson’s orders concerning
the withdrawal of the U.S. military personnel who had fought in Europe are instructive
in regard to the fear of the communist “contagion.” In 1919, concerned that Black
soldiers returning from Europe would provide a means of disseminating Bolshevist ideas in the U.S.,
Wilson ordered a kind of “quarantine.” Why this applied only to Black soldiers
isn't clear, but the measure is informative of the fear of the spread of communism.
The tale repeated by
newspapers about the consequences of the Versailles Treaty serves to perpetuate
a distorted image of Keynsianism, which had resulted
in considerable damage well before the advent of the “welfare state.” If the world
war of 1914-18 is over, the “great war” to remove the intellectual influence of
Keynes from Western society has hardly even begun.
