Presidents Medvedev and Obama: More than just
mood music?
Gazeta, Russia
Obama and Medvedev: Good Mood Music that Skirted the Central Issues
"It's
not just the era of Russia's status as a superpower that has come to an end,
but the era of American hegemony. Neither side has yet to fully recognize this.
… But the revelation will inevitably come, and with it, perhaps, another lens
through which Russia and America will look at one another."
The first meeting between Dimitry Medvedev and Barack Obama in London didn't bring a
breakthrough in relations, but was, no doubt, a positive event. The confidence the
meeting inspired wasn't due to the results achieved - there weren't and couldn't
have been results achieved that quickly - but rather to the attitude of the two
sides.
Both of them appear to be
pragmatists who aspire to deal rationally with the difficult legacy of previous
years. Vladimir Putin and George Bush Jr. were no longer capable of a new vision.
Too many hopes turned to great disappointment. Their personal attitudes toward one
another and the key issues on the table weighed too heavily on matters of state.
The London meeting offers hope
that there will now be more common sense and accurate calculation between our
two nations - and less emotion and exasperation.
The meeting showed that both
sides understand the need to begin on issues where U.S.-Russia interests are either
the same or at least compatible, and hence progress is more likely. Therefore, during
the first stage, talks about future agreements on Afghanistan and START [Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks] are center stage.
On strategic arms, a mutually
acceptable solution is possible. The gradual reduction of capacity is of
benefit to all. It will allow cuts in unwanted surpluses and establish an institutional
dialogue with an acceptance of conditions that hasn't occurred between Russia
and the United States in a very long time. Besides, talks on arms reduction are
the only sphere in which both countries equal, which is an important
psychological factor for Moscow.
An understanding on the Afghan
transition is completely logical as well. There is no fundamental disagreement
on Afghanistan and the “Taliban” movement lacks friends among the world's leading
players. And Russia need not exert an extraordinary effort - only enough to
offer feasible and, in fact, commercially-favorable cooperation.
In the longer term, there is
no clarity on the situation in Afghanistan because the goals of the operation are
unclear. The original objective - a stroke of retribution for September 11 and
destruction of the terrorist infrastructure - was already achieved in the fall
of 2001. Since then, the Afghan campaign has remained on the periphery of
American attention - which was focused on Iraq. Today the situation in
Afghanistan threatens to spiral out of control and the conditions needed for a
withdrawal of Western coalition forces have yet to be created. Judging by Washington's
changing tone, this will become the goal: avoiding humiliation while preparing
the ground for a pullout. Hence the trial balloons about “moderate” Taliban. And
after a U.S. and NATO withdrawal, Afghanistan will mean new problems for
Russia, but that is a matter for the future.
These two lines of reasoning are
where the easy part of the journey ends; all further items on the agenda are
bound to result in conflict.
The issue of a common defense
against nuclear attack, mentioned by Obama, is very delicate, so its turn will come
last - if the level of trust increases significantly. It's more likely to
crown, not inaugurate, the process of “rebooting” relations.
The situation with Iran is
extremely difficult. Moscow and Washington evaluate the level of threat differently
- and hence the nature of the Teheran regime. In America as in Israel, the regime
is suspected of irrationality and religious fanaticism. In Russia, Iranian
bombs and rockets evoke much less concern, but rather draw attention to Iran's
calculated desire to become a regional power. Since in any of its incarnations,
Iran will remain an important neighbor of Russia - and not the United States -
Moscow is trying to seize the moment to establish beneficial relations with
Teheran - both commercially and geopolitically.
From left to right: Obama, Berlusconi and Medvedev are
all smiles at taking of the 'family photo' at G20 Summit.
But this isn't the main
problem. Putting a stop to Iran's nuclear program through diplomacy is most
likely impossible. Theoretically, one can imagine a dramatic shift in
Washington's policies, much like its reconciliation with China in the early
1970s. But the likelihood is low - a theocratic regime is a far more difficult
partner than a communist one.
Since Teheran's acquisition
of nuclear status will be followed by the uncontrolled collapse of the non-proliferation
regime, the United States considers this an existential threat. So the question
of a military solution will inevitably come before the Obama Administration,
and in a far more practical dimension than it did for Bush-Cheney. This will
create a new situation, and in this, the consequences for Russia are difficult
to calculate.
Any compromise on the former Soviet
space is virtually out of the question. Washington will never recognize Moscow's
right to a sphere of influence, since this goes against the spirit of American
politics. The Kremlin, for its part, will never give up on its claims.
From Russia's perspective, if
it doesn't possess a special status on the territory of the former Soviet
Union, it will be unable to protect its vital interests in the spheres of
security and economy.
Nonetheless, some
improvement can be expected. The involvement of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO, as
well as the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system in Central Europe,
are much lower on Obama's list of priorities than they were on Bush's. They
will not be removed from the agenda, but they aren't the issues regarded as
most relevant. Washington will try to “sell” this to Moscow as a concession and
for a time will be able to use these issues to bargain with - so as not to
interfere with progress in other areas.
Posted
by WORLDMEETS.US
Of course, Obama won't be
able to start U.S. policy in the region with a clean slate, and America's
desire for a strategic presence in the region has been discounted by no one.
But the current president, unlike Bush, isn't bound by personal obligation to [Georgia
President] Mikhail Saakashvili or [Ukraine President]
Viktor Yushchenko.
There is a common problem
that makes cooperation difficult - the asymmetry of relations. The United
States is much more important to Russia than vice versa, and this isn't going
to change, since the capabilities of the two powers aren't
comparable.
And even in objective
asymmetry, there is a subjective bias. Over the past nearly two decades, Washington
has gotten used to belittling Moscow's significance, viewing it as less
important than it really is. Moscow, on the other hand, tends to exaggerate the
role of Washington, completely demonizing it. Obama's administration, it seems,
understands the need to get rid of this bias and look at Russia with greater
realism. At least the United States is displaying more tact than it has up to
now.
Posted
by WORLDMEETS.US
The question that cannot be
answered today, but will certainly arise in a few years: In the 21st century,
what are Russia and the United States to one another? For now, relations
between Moscow and Washington remain, in essence, a residue of the Cold War.
The problems discussed are either legacies of that period or consequences of
its conclusion. But this will not always be the case, as a dramatically changing
global situation erases the old agenda.
It's not just the era of
Russia's status as a superpower that has come to an end, but the era of
American hegemony. Neither side has yet to fully recognize this.
But the revelation will
inevitably come, and with it, perhaps, another lens through which Russia and
America will look at one another.
*Fyodor Lukyanov is Chief Editor for Russian in Global Affairs
