Gorbachev to NATO:
'Learn from Our Mistakes in Afghanistan'
"It's necessary to understand why this is happening and what can be done in this almost catastrophic situation. Our biggest mistake was a failure to understand the peculiarities of Afghanistan. ... In the end we got what we wanted to prevent: further destabilization and a de-facto war that killed thousands, with dangerous consequences for our country."
The
situation in Afghanistan has been strained to the limit. People who are dying, among
them Afghan civilians, women, children, and the elderly, have no relation to
the terrorists and militants. The country's government is losing control over
its territory - more than ten out of 34 provinces are almost entirely
controlled by the Taliban. The production and export of drugs is growing. There
is a real danger of serious destabilization of other countries in the region - not
only Pakistan but also the republics of Central Asia. Launched after the events
of September 11, 2001, what seemed to be a reasonable action to eliminate the
nest of terrorism in Afghanistan threatens to become a major strategic failure.
It's
necessary to understand why this is happening and what can be done in this
almost catastrophic situation. The recent London conference, with the
participation of several countries and international organizations, is only the
first step in this direction. The conference was preceded by intensive preparatory
work on decisions that could change the direction of developments, but only if we
reevaluate the entire experience of the last three decades.
In 1979, the
Soviet leadership decided to introduce troops into Afghanistan, justifying this
step not only by a desire to assist friendly forces, but also the need to
stabilize the situation in a neighboring country. Our biggest mistake was a
failure to understand the peculiarities of Afghanistan; its incredibly complex
ethnic, tribal and clan structure, unique traditions, and disinclination toward
governance. In the end we got what we wanted to prevent - further
destabilization and a de-facto war that killed many thousands of people, with
dangerous consequences for our country. In addition, the West and particularly
the United States, acting in the spirit of the Cold War, added fuel to the fire:
they were ready to support anyone, just to spite the Soviet Union. They didn't
think of the consequences.
With the
beginning of Perestroika,
the new Soviet leadership drew some conclusions from the negative experience of
our presence in Afghanistan. Two fundamental decisions were made. The first was
to take a course for the withdrawal of our troops from that country. The second
was to work with all parties to the conflict, including other countries who
were involved in the interests of Afghanistan national reconciliation, in order
to make it a peaceful, neutral state that wouldn’t pose a threat to others.
Looking back,
I can say that this was the correct, responsible "dual decision." I
am sure that if it had been fully implemented, many of the consequences could
have been avoided. And we not only declared such a course, but honestly, aggressively
pursued it in real life.
Success in
this required sincere and responsible cooperation of all parties. The then-leadership
of Afghanistan showed a willingness to compromise and did more than its share to
achieve reconciliation. And in some provinces of the country, this process had
begun. But the U.S. and Pakistan, especially Islamabad's military elite, blocked
all paths to a settlement. They were only interested in one thing: the
withdrawal of Soviet troops, after which they saw themselves as masters of the
situation. By depriving the Government of Najibullah of even minimal support, Boris Yeltsin played into
their hands.
By the 1990's,
the world seemed to have lost interest in Afghan affairs; and meanwhile, those forces
that have turned it into a stronghold of Islamic fundamentalism and hotbed of the
terrorist menace came to power. Politicians in the West only came to their
senses only after the tragic events of September 11. But even here, they made a
decision that today we should assess as not fully thought through, and one-sided.
After
overthrowing the Taliban government, the U.S. decided that its job was
essentially done, and that a military solution achieved with little bloodshed
would strongly take hold. Apparently, the initial success played a role in the
ease with which the Americans took the next step toward the militarization of Middle
East politics; I refer to the decision that by then had already been made -
military intervention in Iraq. In Afghanistan, meanwhile, they were building a
democratic facade which was supposed to be guarded by the "International
Security Assistance Force," in other words, NATO troops. This organization
is increasingly contesting the role, in essence, of international policeman.
The rest is
well-known. The military method of resolving the Afghan problem was increasingly
showing its shortcomings with each passing year. This was a secret to no one
and everyone was talking about it - even the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, whose
desperate telegram recently became public. And when I was asked what I would
recommend to President Obama, who has inherited a
difficult situation from his predecessor, I answered: the goal should be a political settlement and withdrawal
of troops. And this requires a strategy of national reconciliation.
And suddenly
in London, proposals were heard that we had made to our partners, but in our
time weren't met with the required understanding: reconciliation, involving all of the more-or-less reasonable
factions in
the process of rebuilding the country, shifting the emphasis from military operations to political ones. The U.N.
representative in Afghanistan said that we should talk about the
demilitarization of the entire Afghanistan strategy. It's a pity that this
wasn't said - and done - much earlier!
The way
ahead will be very difficult. At the moment, the chances of success - and it is
success and not military "victory," that should be the topic of
conversation - can be described as "fifty-fifty" at best. Contact
with elements of the Taliban have been initiated. We must now persevere in the
process of involving Iran and working actively with the Pakistanis.
Posted by WORLDMEETS.US
Russia can
and should be an important player in the Afghan settlement. The West should appreciate
the position Russia's leadership has adopted on the Afghan question. This
position is far from a gloating avoidance; you suffer there, while we wash (or
rub) our hands, so to speak. Russia is ready to cooperate with the West on this
matter, because it properly understands its interests and sees that Afghan as a
source of threats is dangerous to it. And it is entirely legitimate to ask why,
in all the years that U.S. and NATO troops have been present, virtually nothing
has been done to address the problem of drug production, most of which ends up passing
through the "porous" borders of neighboring countries like Russia, posing
a threat to the nation's health? Another of Russia's demands is also justified -
participation in economic projects, including the restoration of dozens of
facilities built with our help and destroyed in the 1990's. Russia, a neighbor of
Afghanistan, is ready to cooperate, but its interests must be taken into
account. It would seem elementary logic, but a reminder is needed.
It is hoped
that the history of long-suffering Afghanistan is entering a new stage, and that
for millions of Afghans there is a glimmer of hope. The opportunity really has arrived,
but its implementation requires a lot; realism, perseverance, and last but not
least, an honest assessment of the mistakes made in the past and the capacity
to learn from them.
