President Barack Obama takes the oath for his second term
as president of the United States: The international community
expects him to lead an extremely slimmed-down foreign policy.
Obama II: Prepare
for America's New Danger-Averse Global Course (NeueZuercherZeitung, Switzerland)
"Weakened
by years of partisan bickering but freed of the pressure of having to face popular
election again, Barack Obama will on Sunday begin his second term as leader of
the United States. ... There will be no
more large-scale operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pressure on the
Pentagon to economize will continue to grow. Land forces, in particular, will have
to justify their existence. Faced with the choice of trimming the social
welfare state or the military budget, Obama will no doubt choose the latter."
Weakened by years of partisan bickering but freed of the
pressure of having to face popular election again, Barack Obama on Sunday will
begin his second term as leader of the United States. The message with which he
will address the nation in front of the Capitol the next day is a well-kept
secret, but one thing is certain to be included in his speech: The word
"new."
This is a rhetorical ingredient, the value was already appreciated
by one of Obama's predecessors. In 1989, President George H.W.
Bush spoke of a "new breeze," and later of a "new world
order," that, along with the end of the Cold War, would pave the way for
an era of harmony. Bush's successor, Bill Clinton, urged the destruction of the
"old order" and the creation of a "new" and freer world
under American leadership. By now, the expression "new world order"
is probably too debased to be used by Obama for inspiring an atmosphere of
change and optimism. But on the global stage, a changed world order is most
certainly discernible - one in which the role of Americans has changed considerably.
Onlookers in Mali
Over the past few days, the attitude of the United States on
the conflicts in Mali and Afghanistan have illustrated this not once - but
twice. With their passivity in the face of the French intervention in Mali, the
Americans have signaled that they intend to exercise extreme caution before
being drawn into another war. While Washington has welcomed this military
action, it put Paris' request for logistical support on the back burner for
now. It is true that France is accustomed to conducting solo interventions on
African soil. But "Operation
Serval" on desert terrain the size of France
is much more demanding than France's occasional military actions in recent
years in the Ivory Coast, Somalia, and Chad. President Hollande's
goal of restoring stability to Mali can only be achieved with a massive,
broadly-supported, multi-year international effort. What's new is that the U.S.
is not instinctively pushing for a leadership role in a kind of "coalition
of the willing." Already during the Libya war, the United States at least
outwardly allowed the French to take the lead. However, at the time, and without
calling attention to the fact, the Americans took on the lion's share of air
operations and helped Europeans when they ran out of ammunition. Obama called
this "leading from behind," which earned him some ridicule - but it
was nonetheless a claim to leadership. That certainly cannot be said of Mali.
Another new feature is that the Americans are disavowing jurisdiction
over a mission they only recently considered part of their own "War on
Terror." In Mali, the issue is about wresting control from jihadists over
a vast territory, from which they can move freely and plan operations like the
recent attack in Algeria. So far, the Islamists rampaging in northern Mali have
yet to call for acts of terror overseas. But the Bush Doctrine of 2001 pledges
that the United States will take action against all countries that grant shelter
to terrorists. The government now lists six such "safe havens" for
terrorists related to al-Qaeda around the globe. The Americans have intervened
everywhere in recent years, even if with only pinprick operations. The only
exception is Mali, where the U.S. previously restrained itself from using armed
drones. This reticence reflects the new thinking in Washington: If there is
more at stake for other countries, the Americans won't be pulling their chestnuts
out of the fire. This region does in fact have a greater strategic significance
for France. Paris isn't just concerned about Mali, but about its interests in
neighboring countries, from the energy industry in Algeria to uranium mining in
Niger, all of which is threatened by the unimpeded march of the Islamists.
In Washington today, cool pragmatism now reigns over
Afghanistan policy as well. Obama seems to have quietly said goodbye to the
goals of bringing about peace in the Hindu Kush and preventing a return to
power of the Taliban. All signs point to withdrawal, regardless of how the
situation may appear in two years after the NATO mission. While the generals
recommend a robust military presence beyond 2014, the White House is pushing
for a minimal residual contingent that would likely have the capacity to
conduct no more than the occasional anti-terror operation. The poorly trained
Afghan forces will therefore soon be on their own. The survival of the central
government will then depend on whether foreign powers at least continue to
provide the previously granted financial support. No wonder many Afghans are
preparing for an intensification of the civil war, and that some war lords are
starting to rebuild their militias.
Self-Limitation with Consequences
In a policy paper a year ago, the Obama Administration announced
its course change. It said in the paper that from now on, America would focus
on "low-cost initiatives with a small military footprint." Read:
There will be no more large-scale operations like those in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Pressure on the Pentagon to economize will continue to grow. Land
forces, in particular, will have to justify their existence. Faced with the
choice of trimming the social welfare state or the military budget, Obama will
no doubt choose the latter. From a personnel perspective, he has already laid
the groundwork. With John Kerry as secretary of state and Chuck Hagel as Pentagon chief, he has chosen two secretaries who
are extremely skeptical about interventions abroad. Of course, none of this is
without consequence for global politics. Even if a military intervention
against Iran is not a good idea at the moment, it is just as inadvisable to
signal in advance that military options will not be considered.
Syrian dictator Assad, who probably doesn't feel
particularly threatened by Washington's "low-cost initiatives," can
breathe a sigh of relief. The Americans cannot be faulted for their reticence -
for their interventions in the Islamic world have earned them mainly hatred. But
it would be fatal to ignore the consequences of this change in roles. In Mali,
it means that the risk of failure increases; in Syria, that the country will
sink further and further into civil war and become a cauldron of instability
for years to come.
