[Guardian Unlimited, U.K.]

Kommersant, Russia

Who Wins and Who Loses from NATO's Bucharest Summit?

"Russia’s voice is being heard … and that can be considered a great achievement. … now it's in the Russian interest to see that larger numbers of Ukrainians oppose NATO accession."

By Evgeny Primakov*

Translated By Igor Medvedev

April 4, 2008

Kommersant - Russia - Original Article (Russian)

Who wins and who loses from the summit in Bucharest? Those who ran headlong to NATO despite the likely implications have unequivocally lost. And the implications are clear: a splitting of Ukrainian society and a deterioration of Ukraine's relations with Russia and Georgia. However, I would certainly not speak in terms of a Russian win.

On the one hand, events show that our voice is being heard. And that can be considered a great achievement for Russia, which seeks to be an equal in the international arena. On the other hand, we shouldn’t deceive ourselves: what happened in Bucharest did nothing to negate Georgian and Ukrainian aspirations to join NATO.

And as paradoxical as it is, I think that among the winners was the United States. President Bush stated very firmly that he is fully behind the accession of Ukraine and Georgia, and has thus dramatically improved America's position among the ruling elites of these countries. But now he must meet with Vladimir Putin. I dare to hope that Bush is interested in having a successful meeting. But the chances of success would be much the lesser if at Bucharest, Ukraine and Georgia had been put on track to join NATO.

It is known that on the sidelines of the NATO Summit was a debate on the fate of the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty between Russia and Ukraine. Russia is interested in normal, or perhaps even good relations with Ukraine. And it's in the Russian interest to see larger numbers of Ukrainians oppose NATO accession. According to various estimates, something like half the population is now opposed. If Russia withdraws from the Treaty it will worsen relations with Ukraine and increase the number of Ukrainians wanting to enter NATO.

There is another point. The conclusion of the Treaty, and more importantly, its ratification in April 1999 were closely related to Ukraine’s ratification of the Agreement on the Black Sea Fleet . Under the Agreement, we are guaranteed the right to keep the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol  for another 25 years.

I recall as prime minister, I had come to a Federation Council session where we discussed the ratification of an overall agreement with Ukraine. Our delegates were right not to favor ratification without Ukraine’s agreement on the Black Sea Fleet.

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But Ukrainians didn't want to agree without our ratification of the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty. Then I suggested a two-step method of breaking the impasse. First step - ratification. Second step - an exchange of instruments of ratification, after which Ukraine’s Parliament would pass a law ratifying the Black Sea Fleet Agreement. The impasse was broken. Should we forget this bond that we forged? There are many other ways to show discontent over Ukraine's current policies without breaking the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty. 

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As for prospects of cooperation’s between Russia and NATO, we now have stable relations with that organization, which consists of the Russia-NATO Council. I think that these relations of mutual advantage will continue, in light of our own sober approach toward the North Atlantic Alliance.

*Evgeny Primakov was Boris Yeltsin's Foreign Minister from 1996-1998, an Prime Minister from 1998-1999

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[Posted by WORLDMEETS.US April 3, 7:13Pm]