NATO Leaders meet for the traditional 'family' photo at Chicago’s
Soldier Field: With defense budgets shrinking and threats that
appear to be expanding, can NATO
remain relevant?
Dire Straits for Europe Absent
Less Nationalism and More Cooperation: Gazeta Wyborcza, Poland
“Without a strong
military capability, E.U. diplomacy will be far less effective, and individual
member states - even the larger ones - will find that they are too small to
count on the international stage. … A new E.U. security pact should allow for
the strengthening of Europe’s defense identity … and as a result, address self-interest
and nationalism and all that this entails.”
The financial crisis has had an impact on European security
and defense policy similar to the one that the fall of the Berlin Wall had on NATO
members at the time: a momentary fragmentation that has forced a redefinition
of joint action. Only the development of a shared, long-term security strategy
will allow Europe to maintain and strengthen its defense capability. The NATO summit
should therefore be a moment when Europe proves that it is beginning to
implement such a strategy and is able to speak with one voice and act in unison
on issues of security.
The Balkan crisis in the early 90s alerted European nations to the
importance of autonomy in the area of defense. It led directly to the
establishment of a common security and defense policy. Twelve years later, the purpose
of that policy seems to have been forgotten. In spite of some progress, the European
defense industry continues to be fragmented, a lack of political will has
prevented the implementation of fundamental treaty obligations, and member states,
under the pretext of the financial crisis, are again resorting to
protectionism. This approach will only lead to a dead end, because without determined
efforts at reform and a push toward greater collaboration, the defense and
weapons industries of E.U. countries cannot survive competition driven by the potential
of the United States and the rising powers of Asia and South America.
To escape this impasse requires more than just a substantial
increase on defense spending in national E.U. budgets. For years, their
combined spending for defense has been lower than the U.S. defense budget, the
market has become more fragmented, and E.U. efforts have overlapped. The twenty
seven E.U. countries produce over 80 different weapons systems (the U.S.
produces 27) and maintain more than 60 shipyards, while in the United States there
are two. The lack of a common military market costs the E.U. €3 billion a year
[$3.8 billion]. In today’s economic environment, that is money being too easily
spent.
The financial crisis has further deepened the differences
between the “Union” and the “North American” segment of the Alliance: over the past
ten years, the U.S. and Canadian portions of the NATO budget rose by 10 percent,
up from 65 percent in 2000 to 75 percent in 2011. Estimates from 2011 show
defense cuts in all European NATO countries, and only two maintained defense
spending at 2 percent of GDP, as is required by the Washington Treaty.
Most importantly, there has been a weakening of European countries
with the most important weapons industries, namely France, Germany and Great
Britain (which together contribute 65 percent to the European share of NATO’s
budget and 88 percent of funds for research and development). Because of the
need to finance operating deficits and service debts, the situation in the
defense sector won’t improve until at least 2016. This means that no country on
its own will be able to ensure the E.U.’s defense, not to mention operations
beyond E.U. territory. The intervention in Libya confirmed these deficiencies. Also
confirmed was the reluctance of Americans to defend European strategic
interests, something that was clearly enunciated
by former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates in his farewell speech of
June last year, as well as, soon afterwards, by the new secretary, Leon
Panetta.
[Editor’s Note: In
his farewell address, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in part: “The
blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S.
Congress, and in the American body politic writ large, to expend increasingly
precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the
necessary resources ... to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”
Without additional efforts, it will be difficult for Europe
to maintain its role in its neighborhood and the world. Without a strong
military capability, E.U. diplomacy will be far less effective, and individual
member states - even the larger ones - will find that they are too small to
count on the international stage.
As late as 2010, E.U. defense ministers asserted that the
financial crisis cannot be an excuse for the E.U. to displease with a policy as
important as that of shared security and defense. It is high time to put this
notion into practice. The crisis, just as it is in the realm of economic
policy, can be an opportunity to hammer out a new “security pact,” which would
implement already-existing provisions regarding E.U. defense policy. In a
situation in which the means are limited, we must act together to get more for
less.
But let's not make errors similar to those committed during
negotiations over the Fiscal Compact.
To be effective, a new security pact cannot be a general, inter-governmental
agreement. The E.U. already has a security strategy that takes account of new threats,
and which confirmed the adequacy of NATO’s strategy as expressed in Lisbon.
A new E.U. security pact should allow for the strengthening of Europe’s defense
identity, allow us to confront the current crisis, and as a result, address self-interest
and nationalism and all that this entails. It should express a coherent, long-term
security strategy based on trust between states, in which national plans and the
priorities of E.U. member countries are complementary; and it should be a
strategy that at the same time defines the role of the E.U. in NATO, without the
duplication of efforts but also without sticking our heads in the sand. The
current political ping-pong in relations between the E.U. and NATO must now be replaced
by a shared strategy and complementary action. For this to happen, Europe must
be able to put more of its defense capabilities into the common basket of
transatlantic defense.
There are many scenarios for necessary change. The main
thing for the E.U. side is that defense must no longer be held hostage to
short-sighted political calculation that emerge out of an illusory sense of European
strategic stability, and from this, a sense of security.
The Treaty
of Lisbon introduces a clause in regard to collective defense, and the E.U.
must adopt measures to fulfill its ambitions. This can only be achieved by boosting
its efforts and implementing greater “pooling and sharing,” which was first
initiated in 2010 by the E.U. Council of Ministers consisting of the sharing of
military resources and a division of labor.
Defense cooperation cannot be confined to logistics and
training – as it was before. There must be streamlined decision-making, a
reinforcement of E.U. planning structures, and purchasing plans, communications
systems, and systems of acquiring intelligence and surveillance must be coordinated.
In addition, treasury ministers should occasionally attend meetings of defense
ministers so the latter will be able to plan with full knowledge of the available
means, and in their turn, treasury ministers will help as they are knowledgeable about the
challenges and potential benefits of scale.
Just as with policies on stability and growth, E.U. security
policy should be discussed anew by member state leaders. May the NATO summit in
Chicago be such a stimulus, and the crisis in the E.U. an alarm bell leading to
a greater integration of European security and defense.
*JacekSaryusz-Wolski
is the head of the European Parliament delegation for the relations with NATO's
Parliamentary Assembly
