Gazeta Wyborcza, Poland

Polish Security Must Be

Assured Before We Accept

U.S. Missile Interceptors

"The compensation should be calculated not in billions of dollars, but in providing Poland with the same standard of security that we had before the base's installation, no matter how much it will cost the United States … Washington must also understand that if our expectations are not met and Warsaw resists caving into pressure coming from Washington and from America's friends in Poland and decides against locating such a base in our country, this will not mean a retreat from its close alliance with the United States.'"

By Roman KuŸniar

Translated By Halszka Czarnocka

January 29, 2008

Poland - Gazeta Wyborcza - Original Article (Polish)

Poland is in the middle of difficult negotiations about its possible role in the American ballistic missile defense program WATCH . And just when our government faces the difficult task of rationalizing Poland's position, a growing wave of criticism has arisen to try and hurry things up and take the government to task over its conduct.

Critics of the government write, "By defying Washington, we risk our alliance with America, and in any case, what counts in this alliance are values - not arms deals." The idea that we may be, "dragging our heels" or "playing for time," until a change in administration in Washington is being met with severe condemnation.

Such voices come perhaps as a surprise, but not overly so. Accommodating the interests of other powers is not new to Polish culture or political thought. But this time we shouldn't succumb to doing so, since criticism notwithstanding, we're dealing here with Poland's basic security interests.

As is necessary, Prime Minister Donald Tusk's government opted to rationalize of our approach to the missile shield because up to now, Polish policy has been entirely emotional, i.e. based on traditional Polish feelings for the United States. Those feelings in the case of the U.S. have a very sound basis, but as Oscar Wilde once said, "When in love, don't close your eyes."

Saying yes to the shield has enormous strategic implications for our country, which is often blissfully ignored by our own enthusiasts for the project.

First, the negotiations under way are not in any way caused by threats to our own security. There are no security issues to call for our participation in the U.S. missile shield program.

Moreover, according to many trustworthy analysts and observers, there is no such threat to the U.S. either. Such well-known figures as historians Norman Davies or Niall Ferguson even see the missile shield as proof of the irrationality of the Bush Administration's security policy.

Wolfgang Panofsky, a long-time presidential advisor on nuclear policy, recently wrote in Foreign Affairs what I have maintained from the very beginning: that the program is a consequence of America's technological and financial potential, and not a response to a realistic threat.

In this case, our ally America is not in danger, as some say, but with our participation is simply treating itself to a luxury. And we have entered into these negotiations because of our desire to maintain close relations with the U.S., not because we were afraid of Iran or anyone else.

Second, our own national security is the absolute limit of compromise in these matters. The government is right in its assessment that the installation of a missile shield base in Poland will negatively impact our security. And that's why it is pressing - not to get something in return as the critics charge, but for duly balancing the equation. Both sides should gain in security, not just the U.S. - and to our detriment. The compensation should be calculated not in billions of dollars, but in supplying Poland with the same standard of security that we had before the base's installation, no matter how much it will cost the United States. In any case, the profit of American firms contracted to build the shield and which have so actively lobbied for its construction in our nation will be compensated many times more. The defenders of American interests in Poland need not concern themselves about that.

Up to now, Washington seems not to have understood that it's Poland that is gambling with its national security. Arguments about the alliance of values aren't serious. It's unacceptable that the weaker side should be satisfied with values alone, while the profits - both material ones and those drawn from improved security - are all on the side of the more powerful partner.

Third, we have time. This doesn't have to be a success of this or that administration, or of this or the other prime minister. The policy must be a success for both sides; only then will it strengthen the Polish-American alliance. There's no hurry - and there's no reason to play for time, either. Nothing terrible will happen if the building of the shield starts in two years instead of next year. Nothing terrible will happen if negotiations are finalized with a Democratic administration. That will also be an American administration, just as the Bush White House is, although such a [Democratic] administration will probably be more reasonable and more able to accommodate the expectations of such a close ally as Poland.

Washington must also understand that if our expectations are not met and Warsaw resists caving into pressure coming from Washington and from America's friends in Poland and decides against locating such a base in our country, this will not mean a retreat from its close alliance with the United States. Poland has good reason to desire such an alliance, but it can't be the one-way street it has become over the past few years.

There is no problem with Poland treating America seriously. But there is a problem of current American administration treating Poland seriously enough. Commentators and American experts should understand that relations would be served better by treating our security concerns seriously, rather than by demanding that the Polish government make quick concessions to its powerful ally.

The public will not forgive those who, for the sake of pleasing one American administration, risked Polish national interests. In the long term, this would lead to an erosion of the U.S. alliance and the erosion of Polish trust in such an alliance.

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CLICK HERE FOR POLISH VERSION

[WORLDMEETS.US Posted Feb. 5, 9:45am]