For Americans and Russians, Kyrgyzstan Overshadows Nukes
"If before the main field of
tension existed between 'nuclear buttons' in the Kremlin and White House, today
there are 'sparks' around the perimeter of Eurasia, where the ambitions of
Russia as a regional power collide with attempts by the United States to show
global leadership."
President Obama and Russian President
Medvedev after signing START - the new U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, in Prague. But how relevant will the deal be to U.S.-Russia relations in the future?
By coincidence, the
Russian-American agreement on START was signed in Prague on the same day that
the Bishkek coup took place. The two events of course aren’t related, but the
coincidence well illustrates the difference between past and future priorities.
Despite the symbolic
importance of reducing nuclear arsenals, relations between Moscow and
Washington will in the future depend much more on issues like Kyrgyzstan.
Once the whole world watched how
relations between the two nuclear superpowers unfolded, because almost the entire
tone of international affairs depended on it. Now everything is different.
Let's say for example that the treaty wasn't signed, or isn't ratified. What would
happen? Even the densest of hawks doesn’t expect a nuclear war. Reductions in
missiles and warheads will occur within the context of ordinary attrition and
technological upgrading. At the same time, neither country will fall to a level
that would deprive it of its exclusive status and the capacity for mutually
assured destruction (and have not fallen to such a level under the new treaty).
In other words, by and large
nothing will change. And the world's biggest problems will continue to be
determined by the same things that determine them now: the depth and intensity
of various regional conflicts, which have, one way or another, drawn in the
great powers - including Russia and the U.S. By the way, the real threat of the
21st century - not the invented ones - are due to regional factors rather than a
confrontation between the two grandees.
In other words, if before the
main field of tension existed between “nuclear buttons” in the Kremlin and
White House, today there are "sparks" around the perimeter of Eurasia, where the ambitions of
Russia as a regional power collide with attempts by the United States to show
global leadership. Within this context, Kyrgyzstan is certainly not the greatest
example, but it's a typical one: there is no other place where American and
Russian military bases are in such proximity.
The U.S. military presence in
Central Asia is one of the fruits of the “anti-terrorist coalition” proclaimed
after the attacks of September 11, 2001. At the time, Presidents Vladimir Putin
and George W. Bush signed a sort of informal agreement; in any case, that's how
it was understood in Moscow. Russia didn't prevent penetration by the United
States into a region where Moscow had a dominant influence. In return, Russia
expected qualitatively different relations with Washington. Apparently, the
United States sees the essence of the “contract” differently: America takes the
brunt of the war with the new "absolute evil," and in return other
countries are to provide their complete support.
The Kremlin soon became
disillusioned with the nature of the transaction. First, after the rapid defeat
of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the long-term plans of the NATO operation hung
in the air. No one believed in the likelihood of building a modern and
democratic Afghanistan, so suspicions abounded that this was just an excuse to consolidate
in a strategically-important part of Eurasia. Second, 2002-2005 saw a dramatic rise
in the activity of American policy within the former Soviet Union, which was interpreted
by Moscow as a violation of all gentleman's agreements.
Instead of a new era of
cooperation, the parties clashed in a geopolitical battle over Ukraine and
Georgia - and the heat of competition began to grow within other former Soviet
republics. The Kyrgyz coup five years
ago was regarded as a manifestation of this competition - although
the role of external factors there isn't entirely clear.
At the same time, the feeling
arose that the 2001 Putin-Bush transaction was no longer valid. Formally, the
signal was a statement by member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization in the summer of 2005, which called for the setting of
deadlines for the closure of U.S. military bases in Central Asia. But a real
chance to "squeeze out" the United States came only after the start
of the global financial crisis, when many post-Soviet countries were in desperate
economic straights.
In February 2009, [Former] Kyrgyz
President Kurmanbek Bakiyev
announced the imminent closure of the Manas
military base in exchange for a large package of Russian material
assistance; the connection was hardly hidden (in fact, speaking publicly in Washington
recently, President Medvedev acknowledged this with remarkable frankness).
Already in March, there were rumors that the base could simply be renamed a transit
center and even be extended - which occurred in July. Moscow pretended that it
didn't object, but was stunned by Bishkek's
behavior. In August, Russia attempted to re-take the lead in the race, agreeing
to open a second base in Osh, but matters didn't get beyond talks. The next act
of the play was the coup and ensuing rise to power of the “tulip revolutionaries”
after the ouster of Bakiyev.
Moscow is hardly involved in
the change of power: the five-year reign of the Bakiyev clan brought the
country to such a state, that a spark no matter how small was enough. However,
the speed with which Russia has recognized the new government, contrary to
custom, has clearly demonstrated which side it dislikes.
It's amusing to watch the
situation - which is opposite of what usually occurs following a “revolution.”
Now that Moscow has welcomed the overthrow of the corrupt tyrannical regime,
Washington is wavering and suspects a hostile “foreign hand.”
Posted by WORLDMEETS.US
Anti-government
demonstrators clash with policeman during rioting
near
the presidential offices in the Kyrgyzstan capital of Bishkek.
Now the fun begins - how will
Russian-American relations unfold? The most unpleasant scenario: Russia
strictly requires the “revolutionaries” to get rid of Manas; and the U.S.
undertakes to buy off another Bishkek government. In this case, déjà vu awaits
both great powers. Russia will again be deceived (not necessarily out of
cunning, but simply because of the weakness of the Kyrgyz leadership and its
incapacity to withstand pressure from the other side). And the United States will
once again be touched by an unstable regime - a union that severely
compromises it. Not to mention the fact that the dividends of this bout will be
reaped by a third force: neighboring China.
Conversely, if Moscow and
Washington can agree to rules of the game and respect for mutual interests,
both can get their way. Russia will achieve stability in Kyrgyzstan and ensure
its influence there and the U.S. will retain its base, which is important for
the Afghan campaign - even more so, now that the Americans are trying to
achieve decisive success and create the conditions for a gradual withdrawal. In
other words, a "new deal" is needed to replace the one concluded in the
autumn of 2001, and this time the terms and intents should be negotiated clearly
and directly.
Kyrgyzstan is a tiny proving
ground for a new era in U.S.-Russia relations. There will be many cases in
which the overall strategic competition will combine with a coincidence of
interests on some specific issues. (One of them, incidentally, is Iran. Neither
Russia nor the United States sincerely want it to obtain nuclear weapons, but
the rest of their views on the country are very different.)
Posted by WORLDMEETS.US
Eurasia is the main arena for
international politics, but its center is moving from the continent's western
part to the east. In every case, the content of Russia-U.S. relations will require
continuous adjustment of the balance between competition and cooperation - from
Ukraine to Afghanistan, from the Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean, from the
Arctic to the Indian subcontinent. There are and cannot be any panaceas, but
there is need for a set of basic rules like those formed somewhere in the midst
of the Cold War that guaranteed stability. Back then, the rules were based on the
principles of nuclear deterrence which were later codified by relevant
treaties. What agreements will be needed now are so far not only unclear, they
aren't even a topic of discussion.
*Fyodor Lukyanov is Chief Editor for Russian in Global
Affairs
