OBAMA'S BLACKBERRY: 'AHMADINEJAD WOULD LIKE

TO FOLLOW YOU ON TWITTER'

CAPTION: 'AHMADINEJAD WANTS TO FOLLOW OBAMA'

[Hoje Macau, Macau]  

 

Gazeta, Russia

Ahmadinejad 'Must Be Offered Something'

 

"Russia doesn't have complete freedom of action: we have various types of relations with Iran. We have economic relations, relations on energy - and a partnership within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. For Russia, friendly relations with Iran must be preserved. Therefore, we're more limited - we have less freedom of action on the Iranian question than the United States."

 

-Victor Kremenyuk, deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada at the Russian Academy of Sciences

 

Interview with Victor Kremenyuk

        

Conducted by Svetlana Yaroshevskaya

Translated By Yekaterina Blinova

 

June 27, 2009

 

Russia - Gazeta - Original Article (Russian)

President Obama delivers a speech at the New Economic School in Moscow, laying out what he hopes will be a new relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Unfortunately, the Russian government prevented it from being seen in translated form on all but one minor TV network.

 

RUSSIA TODAY: President Obama's speech to the New Economic School in Moscow, July 7, 00:31:50RealVideo

In regard to the possibility of improved relations between Iran and the U.S. and what role Russia might play, Victor Kremenyuk, the deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada at the Russian Academy of Sciences, spoke to Gazeta.

 

GAZETA: Talk of the possibility of a dialogue between the United States and Iran began well before the presidential election in the United States. Can we now say that such forecasts were justified?

 

VICTOR KREMENYUK: So far, not really. Perhaps it's too early. Publicly, virtually nothing has been said about a dialogue - and nothing has been done. In my opinion, that's because Washington was waiting to the last minute to see who would win the Iranian [presidential] election. There were hopes that Moussavi, considered to be the least ideological candidate, would win. Perhaps it would have been easier and more convenient to have congratulated him on his victory as a way of improving relations. But the winner was Ahmadinejad.

 

Therefore efforts must be directed at him, he must be offered something. Moreover, speaking of his election victory, Ahmadinejad decided to borrow this idea from Moussavi and expressed a readiness for dialogue with the United States. It can therefore be expected that both Washington and Teheran will take some steps toward reconciliation. But the intervening factor mixed into this is instability in Teheran, and as far as that goes, the wisest decision on the part of the American president would be to wait and see how the opposition’s challenges [to the results] play out.

 

GAZETA: There is a general view that who actually won the election isn't so critical, because the Ayatollah Khomeini’s opinion is the deciding factor.

 

VICTOR KREMENYUK: In my opinion, this is a realm of speculation and fantasy. Ayatollah Khomeini is a religious leader for whom America isn't a state, nor a potential partner, but a Satan. Therefore, he cannot express sympathy for the United States.

 

At the same time, Iran needs to resolve the problems that have accumulated. One segment of the Iranian political class sees increasing aggressiveness and support for radical movements as the solution (this is Ahmadinejad and his supporters). Others are aware that Iran needs to modernize, that it needs to improve manufacturing in many of its industries. Iran is an industrialized country, but it cannot compete on an international level. It is being left behind technologically, it needs to update its technological infrastructure, and in order to do this, it needs to improve relations with countries that could share these technologies: for instance, Germany, France and Russia.

 

'AHMADINEJAD'

[Al-Ahram, Egypt]

 

GAZETA: How do you interpret the way Ahmadinejad has remained in power - does it mean the preservation of the old order, or perhaps, particularly under the influence of opposition-minded citizens, that he will behave differently?

 

VICTOR KREMENYUK: Ahmadinejad isn't one of those political leaders whose can be predicted. He's full of surprises and might behave in a number of different ways, but I think that he has squeezed all he could out of the confrontation with America. He demonstrated toughness, firmness, even aggressiveness - and loyalty to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. But now, life goes on.

 

What if the policy of confrontation with the United States culminates in, let us say, a major military strike on Iran? Iran is likely to be the loser, and then Ahmadinejad, with all his bravado, will find himself in a very unenviable situation.

 

He had a very awkward end to his term. And this is why there is reason to think about resolving the gridlock with the United States, and, if Obama will give him any hint, I think he will respond.

 

GAZETA: In what format will this reconciliation occur?

 

VICTOR KREMENYUK: One of many. Since the American hostages were seized in 1979, many problems have accumulated. For instance, the freezing of Iranian assets and the U.S. blockade of Iran. They can begin with small steps, removing, one by one, the restrictions and prohibitions that the U.S. imposed 30 years ago. They could start with a downright breakthrough: organize a meeting between Obama and Ahmadinejad, in, let’s say, New York or Europe. They could begin with almost anything. But then again, first we'll have to wait until the end of the current clash between the regime and the opposition.

 

GAZETA: Will the parties impose preconditions? Will both the U.S. and Iran ask for something before the start of the negotiations?

 

VICTOR KREMENYUK: Anything's possible, including this. But raising preconditions would render the entire venture meaningless.

 

Preconditions almost always predetermine the failure of these types of initiatives. If Obama decides to demand something from Ahmadinejad beforehand, why would he agree? And vice versa.

Posted by WORLDMEETS.US

 

If there is a desire to negotiate, they shouldn't begin with a dictation of conditions. There are motives for reconciliation on both sides, but the situation is extremely fragile and can be easily destroyed.

 

GAZETA: Do you think all of the scenarios for the development of U.S.-Iranian relations [discussed before the Iranian election] are still possible?

 

VICTOR KREMENYUK: I would like to say no - that everything has changed and some options have been eliminated. But I can't say that. I wouldn't even rule out the possibility of a military strike on Iran. And Obama himself wouldn't make promises about this. He would no doubt want the Iranians to understand that if the talks go badly, they could receive a powerful strike. And no one will here will stop Obama. So why would he say that he won’t strike? Let the Iranians think that that he can and will.

 

GAZETA: At the summit in Moscow, could Obama raise the issue of Iran and try to include Russia in the establishment of a dialogue with Iran?

 

VICTOR KREMENYUK: Of course, the United States wants Russia to participate in this - and help mend relations with Iran. For Russia, there are indeed opportunities in this direction, but not great ones.

 

Russia doesn't have complete freedom of action: we have various types of relations with Iran. We have economic relations, relations on energy - and a partnership within the SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organization]. For Russia, friendly relations with Iran must be preserved. Therefore, we're more limited - we have less freedom on the Iranian question than the United States.

 

Both we and the United States are at the stage of determining the entire range of relations at a number of levels: strategic, regional and bilateral. It is very important to maintain a balance, so that this time, it doesn't work out as though we're conceding something. For instance, for withdrawing troops from Europe, we would see in exchange a halt to NATO expansion. This is a complicated and delicate question. We can take a step toward the United States, and help them, but at the same time we must under no circumstances do so in way that damages our own interests.

 

[Al-Ahram, Egypt]

 

GAZETA: Will our position be clarified before Obama’s visit to Moscow?

 

VICTOR KREMENYUK: I wouldn't try to speculate or comment on it. Obama’s visit isn't about this.

 

Number one on the agenda, the most important thing, the START treaty, must be signed come hell or high water before the year ends. Obama has to discuss START II - and get a feeling for whether Medvedev will take steps to meet him on this. This is such an important question that theoretically, the two diplomatic teams could be put around the table, locked in a room, and kept there until the text of the treaty is ready.  

Posted by WORLDMEETS.US

 

On the other hand, how long will this be a top priority? No, of course neither Russia nor the United States want this. Then, other questions could be raised - regarding cooperation on a different set of problems: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and the Middle East, the Caucuses, Georgia, the Balkans, Ukraine. There are a lot of issues that we need to address positions on each need to be defined: where must we fight to the death - where we can bargain. Diplomats on both sides are undoubtedly working day and night to prepare the agenda. But the final word can only be uttered by the presidents, and only after they talk, understand one another and decide for themselves: is extensive cooperation possible or not? That is when there will be more clarity with regard to Iran.

 

But first we must have success with the START treaty. This will make success on other agenda items possible.

 

GAZETA: Is the North Korean scenario available to Iran?

 

VICTOR KREMENYUK: It may use these tactics. But Iran doesn't have the same goals as North Korea. North Korea's bomb is essential to it: it is the only way their regime can survive. This isn't the problem in Iran. For them, the nuclear program is more of an ambition, and it always sounds different - and has a different price - than a strategy of survival. The same tactic can be used, but not the same strategy, so it sounds completely different. And Iranian and North Korean strategies for relations with the West bare no comparison.

 

CLICK HERE FOR RUSSIAN VERSION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Posted by WORLDMEETS.US July 15, 9:23pm]